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Securing the Rule of Law Through 
Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument From 
Comparative Law 
by RICHARD STITH* 
Introduction 
Can law rule?  For law to rule, it must be enforced.  But when law is 
enforced, not it but its enforcers may rule.  To bind those enforcers firmly 
to the law, they, too, would have to be subjected not only to law but also to 
a still stronger force—which itself may then be lawless.  The very effort to 
secure the rule of law appears to lead instead to ever more powerful human 
rulers. 
Put another way: If we abolish the police and the courts, in order to 
leave people truly “not under man but under God and the law,”1 we invite 
disorder.  But if we give the police or courts—or their superiors—plenary 
power to compel obedience, we invite lawless tyranny.  Law exists in 
tension with order, as well as with disorder. 
The only way fully to escape this contradiction while holding to the 
rule of law ideal is to empower final enforcers who are infallible: both 
perfectly disinterested and perfectly wise in interpreting a complete and 
 
* Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  A.B. (Harvard University); M.A. (University 
of California, Berkeley); Ph.D. (Yale University), J.D. (Yale Law School).  Many colleagues and 
students deserve thanks for their collaboration, especially the author’s research assistants Joel 
Vander Kooi and Ghahre Pascale.  A draft of this article was selected and circulated as Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 1/07, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/070101.html. 
 1. This ancient ideal is ordinarily taken to mean only that our political superiors are bound 
by rules, that they do not act arbitrarily or according to their own will.  See MORTIMER R. 
KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 40-41 (1973).  But in its stronger 
form, attributed to Bracton, it could apply fully only to someone who, like the king, had no 
political superior at all: Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.  See 2 HENRY 
DE BRACTON, The King Has No Equal, in DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIÆ [ON THE 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 33 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1968) (1569), available at 
http://hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton/Unframed/calendar.htm. 
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principled legal order.  Law can rule, can be fully compatible with order, 
only if the human rulers to whom the law is ultimately entrusted are willing 
and able to follow nothing but the law. 
Perhaps fearing disorder above all, nations may be tempted to hope for 
this infallibility or something close to it.  They may entrust their whole 
legal system to one “supreme” or “constitutional” court bound by a 
supposedly systematic and objective legal science.  Both disorder and 
tyranny seem thus to be avoided by having impartial experts hold all others 
to their correct interpretations of the law. 
This Article will argue that total consolidation of legal interpretation 
in a single high court is a mistake in an age where judges themselves, 
throughout the world, believe less and less that law is science rather than 
politics.  Omnipotent politicians are potentially lawless despots. 
Since an intellectual revival of something like legal science seems 
unlikely, for reasons discussed in section III below, this Article proposes an 
institutional remedy for the politicization of legal interpretation that so 
threatens the rule of law.  High court judges (and others) should be given 
new structural incentives to persuade others of the correctness of their legal 
decisions, for in so doing they will tend to anchor those decisions firmly in 
accepted law. 
In order to create judicial incentives to convince rather than to 
command, interpretive centralism must be replaced by interpretive 
pluralism. Only when a central court needs the cooperation of other 
interpreters of the law does it have a strong reason to be convincing in its 
exposition of the law. 
Interpretive pluralism2 can save the rule of law both from tyranny and 
from anarchy.  Official interpretation of the law can be divided or 
balanced3 rather than either consolidated or eliminated entirely.  For 
example, in France there exists more than one official interpreter of the 
constitution.4  This and other viable compromises can be found in the legal 
 
 2. In this Article, interpretive pluralism (or pluralist interpretation) means nothing more 
than the absence of a single binding or authoritative interpretation.  That is, it simply refers to an 
openness to multiple interpretations (herein of law).  It does not affirm the subjectivist view that 
all interpretations are equally valid nor that the adequacy of interpretation cannot be measured by 
how well it comports with that which it interprets. 
 3. Such was, of course, the solution proposed by James Madison with regard to the control 
of political power in general.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 261-63 (James Madison) (Bantam 
Books, 1982) (1787).  This Article attempts to apply the same technique to the particular problem 
of politicized interpretation. 
 4. The Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) regarding lois (statutes) and the 
Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) regarding réglements (regulations).  M.A. GLENDON, M.W. 
GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 120 (2d ed. 1994) (referring to the 
Council of State “in its assumed role as a second constitutional court in France.”). 
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systems of the world, as we shall see.  Nations now drafting or revising 
their constitutions, or entering into a supranational legal order, should not 
feel pressed into granting unlimited interpretive power to any single court 
or other institution.5 
In recent years, American scholarship on both the Left and Right has 
attacked centralized judicial supremacy under rubrics such as 
“departmentalism”6 and “popular constitutionalism.”7  Though that 
 
 5. Nepal, Ukraine, and the European Community (among others) have in recent decades created 
basic laws with centralized final interpretation, while Chile has consolidated previously divided 
authority to interpret its Constitution.  This Article is in part a cautionary response to these and like 
events.  See NEPAL CONST. art. 86 (1990), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.np/main.php?d=lawmaterial&f=constitution_part_11; UKR. CONST. art. 
147, available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm; Treaty Establishing the European 
Community art. 220, Nov. 10, 1997, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 132 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (consolidated 
version), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/ C_2002325EN.003301.html.  
In Chile, the Supreme Court’s final authority over the constitutionality of old law was transferred to the 
Constitutional Tribunal by Ley No. 20.050, published on 26 August 2005.  See CHILE CONST. arts. 93, 
94, available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/normas_reguladoras/constitucion.html. 
 6. The essence of departmentalism is hostility to the supremacy of any one legal institution 
(such as the federal Congress or the Supreme Court).  An accessible introduction to the two basic 
forms of departmentalism, separation vs. coordination (in an essay which also felicitously relates 
the American debates to legal developments in other nations) is Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. 
Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251, 262-63 (2004).  A simple way to contrast the 
two forms: the first would oppose judicial review of other departments, while the second would 
have various departments (including the judiciary) review one another.  This Article is a new 
argument for one or both of those forms of departmentalism, with greater emphasis on the 
second.  They have become quite influential in the United States.  Writing in opposition, Larry 
Alexander and Frederick Schauer already conceded in 1997 that “most scholars . . . believe that 
even when the Supreme Court has spoken on a constitutional issue, non-judicial officials have no 
more obligation to follow its interpretations than the courts have to follow the constitutional 
interpretations of Congress or the executive.  According to what appears to be the dominant view, 
non-judicial officials . . . are duty-bound to follow the Constitution as they see it—they are not 
obligated to subjugate their judgments to what they believe are the mistaken constitutional 
judgments of others.”  Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1997). 
For a fine theoretical and historical analysis of departmentalism, consult ROBERT LOWERY 
CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).  Professor Tushnet counts as a 
sometime-departmentalist voice on the Left.  Note that it is quite a respectable voice: Tushnet was 
president of the American Association of Law Schools during the year 2003, and he has recently 
been granted a chair at the Harvard Law School.  On the Right, or at least Center-Right, one hears 
the departmentalist voice of Michael Stokes Paulsen among others.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217, 225 n.19 (1994), where he lists many distinguished scholars (including Alexander Bickel, 
Herbert Wechsler, and others across the political spectrum) who have challenged the Court’s 
interpretive supremacy.  For a more recent conservative statement, see RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, 
THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 
1997) reprinting and discussing Symposium, End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of 
Politics, 67 FIRST THINGS 18 (1996).  Close to the view of this Article is the “departmentalism” 
of each law-abiding citizen found in SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 43-49 (1988) 
(arguing for individual authority to interpret the Constitution). 
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literature is rich in nuance, it is too deeply embedded in the myriad 
peculiarities of American history and legitimacy to be very useful to 
scholars in other legal cultures.  This Article presents a new argument for 
departmentalism, with emphasis on the sort that would have various 
departments (including the judiciary) review one another.  By working with 
clarity from first principles, the Article seeks to disentangle the idea of 
interpretive pluralism from its particular embodiments in the constitutional 
history of the United States, so that it may be more accessible to those in 
the wider world who may be engaged in forming or reforming a national or 
supranational constitution. 
The first section of the Article will lay out in greater detail some of the 
reasons why the rule of law is both appealing and frightening.  The next 
two sections take up and reject the idea of an infallible or relatively 
infallible court as a solution to the contradiction within the “rule of law” 
 
 7. The essence of popular constitutionalism is the supremacy of “the people” over the 
meaning of constitutional law.  Thus both departmentalism and popular constitutionalism are 
opposed to judicial supremacy, but they diverge with regard to whether there should be final 
popular control over the interpretation of the constitution.  Of course, popular constitutionalists 
may see departmentalism as a useful means to further popular control (with elected officials 
resisting unelected ones in the name of the people, for example) and departmentalists may 
welcome popular support for officials’ resistance to judicial pretensions of supremacy, so the two 
camps may often find themselves allied rather than opposed in practice. 
Mark Tushnet is, in the end, more a popular constitutionalist than a departmentalist, as can be 
seen in his strong attack on judicial review, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999).  Stanford Law School Dean Larry D. Kramer’s recent paean to popular 
constitutionalism, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004), is a wonderful and widely read foray into the history of popular legal 
interpretation in the United States.  Much of Dean Kramer’s support comes from the early role of 
the people as rememberers and enforcers of fundamental customary law.  If we still lived in a 
stable society imbued with great reverence for ancient norms, Kramer could well be right that the 
people as a whole would be the best guardian of our legal foundations.  See FRITZ KERN, 
KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES (S.B. Chrimes trans., Harper Torchbooks 1970) (1914) 
(on the medieval right of resistance to unlawful rule).  But note: the traditional right of American 
juries to determine the law as well as the facts, to be faithful to their own understanding of the 
law rather than to that of the judge, has in our day become a (largely unspoken) right of juries to 
nullify the law.  See John D. Gordon III, Juries as Judges of the Law: the American Experience, 
108 LAW Q. REV. 272 (1992), cited in United States. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 
1997) (“legal decisions by juries were sometimes regarded as an expression of faithfulness to the 
law . . . rather than defiance of the law or ‘nullification.’”).  Likewise, an unchecked popular right 
to determine the meaning of the Constitution could today become a popular right to ignore or 
nullify the Constitution.  For an excellent critique of Kramer’s book along these lines, in clear 
support of judicial supremacy, see Larry Alexander and Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? 
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005).  Since this Article aspires to secure the rule 
of law itself, it opposes both judicial supremacy over law and popular supremacy over law. 
Furthermore, this Article seeks especially to address problems of supranationalist institutions, 
where the workability even of democratic legislative mechanisms may be in doubt and any hope 
for popular interpretation must necessarily be distant.  By contrast, departmentalist solutions are 
ready at hand, as we shall see. 
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ideal.  We shall see that changing ideas both of the nature of interpretation 
and of the nature of a constitution are likely to lead to an ever more 
politicized, and thus less trustworthy, judiciary in this twenty-first century.  
In the final part of the Article, we shall examine closely the only two 
logically possible ways for law to limit any given supreme or constitutional 
court’s power, without giving up the rule of law ideal: “Separation of 
powers” prevents that court from reviewing certain other bodies’ 
interpretations of the law, while “checks and balances” permits certain 
bodies that the court reviews themselves to counter-review the court’s 
decisions.  Either approach, or a mixture of the two, involves a compromise 
that reduces the likelihood of tyranny without incurring an unacceptable 
risk of disorder (although, of the two, “checks and balances” holds more 
tightly to the rule of law, as we shall see).  Such compromises do not bring 
about a principled solution to the tension within the idea of the rule of law, 
but they do offer practical alternatives to the choice between despotism and 
chaos. 
I. Who’s Afraid of the Rule of Law? 
Newly designed constitutions8 sometimes proclaim allegiance to the 
“rule of law,” as opposed to the lawless rule of human individuals.  Why is 
it thought better to be subject to laws rather than to men and women?  At 
least four reasons come easily to mind. 
First, without the “rule of law” there can be no “rule of higher law.”  
Those who acknowledge a non-positive natural or other law, existing prior 
to the State and demanding respect for fundamental human rights, 
necessarily support the “rule of law” ideal.  A tyrant unlimited by law is 
clearly not bound by human rights.  Those who hope for human rights must 
hope also for the rule of law. 
Second, without the rule of law there can be no democracy of any 
substantial size.  There is no way, in any but an inconceivably small polity, 
for a majority vote of the community to decide every individual dispute.  
Only if the majority can enact general rules that can and will be faithfully 
applied by police and courts to individual cases is there any hope that the 
people can govern.  As it was for higher law, the rule of law is necessary 
 
 8. See, e.g., UKR. CONST. art. 8; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 1, § 1(c), available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons1.htm.  See also AFG. CONST. pmbl. 
(2004), available at http://www.moj.gov.af/pdf/constitution2004.pdf; NEPAL CONST. pmbl., para 
3 (1990).  Nepal’s Constitution is currently in flux; a new constitution is being voted on that 
would supersede the constitution of 1990.  As of the submission of this Article, the interim 
constitution of 15 January 2007 is in effect; debate is still taking place regarding amendments to 
the interim constitution.  Kantipur Report, Parliament Discusses Interim Statute Amendment Bill, 
EKANTIPUR.COM, Mar. 6 2007, http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?nid=102781. 
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for rule by the people—though again it is obviously not sufficient, in that 
non-democratic dictators may well also impose their will through 
constitutions and statutes. 
Third, the rule of law secures private personal and economic freedom.  
By providing advance notice of how State officials will deal with crimes 
and civil disputes, the rule of law allows individuals to plan their lives and 
their investments.  Even a non-democratic regime that ignores basic human 
rights guarantees a sphere of individuality to the degree that it adheres to its 
own previously announced rules, rather than changing them ex post facto. 
Fourth, the rule of law legitimates and thus stabilizes governments.  
The above-mentioned values (human rights, democracy, and private 
freedom) are among the chief reasons that women and men are willing to 
tolerate and support being governed.  A government that ignores the rule of 
law undercuts not only those three values but also its own existence.  To 
the degree that stability is good, preserving the State is another reason to 
prefer the rule of law over the discretionary rule of political leaders. 
Because we care so much about the rule of law, we wish to see it 
effectively applied and enforced.  Through mistake or ill will, private 
individuals may not always observe the law if left unsupervised.  Similarly, 
a president or a legislator, despite his or her oath to support the 
constitution, may misinterpret or ignore that document in the pursuit of 
political results.  It is common for courts to take on the function of ensuring 
that such persons in fact do conform to the law—for example, through 
judicial review of legislative and administrative acts, and identifications of 
unconstitutionality (or of potential unconstitutionality).  And their decisions 
may be reviewed by (or referred to) a higher court, a supreme or 
constitutional court whose interpretation of the law is final as to the case at 
hand. 
In order to achieve uniformity of results without relitigating similar 
cases all the way up to the same final authority, it seems sensible to make 
that authority’s interpretation of the law final not only as to the parties 
directly involved, but as to the whole legal system.  This efficiency can be 
achieved either by a “horizontal” version of stare decisis (the Anglo-
American doctrine that a single case opinion binds all like future cases), 
under which there is no point in relitigating old issues insofar as the highest 
court of appeal is committed to not admitting error and correcting its ruling, 
or else a “vertical” version9 of stare decisis, a legally binding declaration 
 
 9. The United States Supreme Court has never adhered to absolute horizontal stare decisis 
(though it does recognize a significant degree of binding power in its own past decisions), and the 
Court did not clearly announce the absolute vertical version until 1958, when it declared that its 
interpretations of the Constitution are the law of the land.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 
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that all other citizens and institutions10 except that court itself are to abide 
by the highest court’s interpretations of the law rather than by what they 
themselves consider the law to be.  Similarly, in nations that do not 
formally recognize the doctrine of stare decisis, a court’s rulings, and even 
its legal interpretations, may still bind erga omnes (“towards all”), not just 
with regard to the immediate parties to the suit.  In the constitution of 
Ukraine, for example, a result nearly identical to vertical stare decisis is 
achieved by the constitutional provision that the new Constitutional Court 
issues “the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and laws of 
Ukraine”11 and that these interpretations “are binding throughout the 
territory of Ukraine, are final, and may not be appealed.”12 
Sensible though it may seem, in the above legal contexts, the idea of 
“binding interpretation” is a very strange animal.  It would be shocking and 
even ludicrous in a literary context, for example.  In an open society, we 
would not tolerate the issuance of an official, binding interpretation of, say, 
Shakespeare—no matter how highly we respected the good faith and 
wisdom of the interpreter.  The reason is simple.  The very idea of 
interpretation contains the notion of a report and with it the idea of 
faithfulness to that about which the report is speaking.  Although we know 
that every interpretation or report is a filter as well as a conduit, that which 
makes an interpretation different from a creation is the element of 
faithfulness to a preexisting original.  Put another way, an interpretation is 
of value not primarily because of what it is in itself but because that which 
is interpreted is of value.  An interpretation is a secondary source of 
information to which we resort when we cannot assess the primary source 
for ourselves.  But because we care about that primary source, we care also 
 
(1958).  That assertion put the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution on a level with the 
Constitution itself, which sounds like both versions of stare decisis at once.  But the Court cannot 
have meant what it said because it has continued to overturn its own prior rulings on occasion, 
something it could not do to the Constitution itself.  Thus, the Cooper doctrine in the end amounts 
simply to a doctrine of judicial supremacy, in that everyone except the Court itself must treat its 
interpretations as the law of the land. 
 10. Stare decisis is ordinarily treated solely as a court practice.  Thus it may sound odd to 
refer to stare decisis as binding “all other citizens and institutions.”  But this is surely the 
doctrine’s effect.  If all courts were to announce their readiness to ignore precedent, citizens 
would be unlikely to continue to feel bound by it. 
 11. UKR. CONST. art. 147; EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 220; S. AFR. CONST. 1996  art. 167, 
cl. 4.  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada, which was created by the Federal Government by 
the Supreme Court Act through §101 of the Constitution Act of 1867, has become the final 
interpreter of all Canadian law, animated apparently by a desire to impose continent-wide 
uniformity.  See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, § 8.5(a) (3d ed. 1992). 
 12. UKR. CONST. art. 150, para. 2.  The context of this provision makes clear that such 
interpretations bind universally.  They do not bind only the particular private parties in the case at 
hand. 
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about correcting errors in the secondary source, once we have the means to 
do so.  To make a secondary source binding would be to say that we no 
longer care about accurately understanding the primary source—
Shakespeare’s works themselves, in our example.  But it was because we 
cared about the primary source that the secondary source had value to 
begin with.  “Binding interpretation” thus makes no sense.13 
It might be said that law is different.  Although we care about being 
faithful to legal texts and other sources of law, especially to constitutional 
ones to the degree that they contain our national foundations, it might be 
argued that the need for uniformity and certainty in law is so great that 
judges must stick with the first interpretation with which they happen to 
come up in the press of deciding a particular case.  Judges must adhere 
even to clearly erroneous judicial interpretations, even on matters of 
fundamental importance, because otherwise the public application of law 
will be less uniform and certain. 
Unfortunately, binding interpretation may sacrifice fidelity to an 
original source without securing uniformity or certainty of application.  If 
interpretation is to bind, then interpretations of prior interpretations will 
come to bind, displacing the earlier ones.  For example, the United States 
Supreme Court has held itself bound not by its first interpretation of a 
constitutional text, but by its later interpretation of that first interpretation 
and so on ad infinitum, without regard to the actual meaning of that text.14  
As in the parlor game where each person seeks solely to repeat a whispered 
message down a line, the message will change and change again.15  Neither 
the original nor a uniform substitute survives.  Furthermore, uncertainty is 
 
 13. Similarly, a dogmatic sort of “pluralist interpretation” would make no sense, at least in 
law.  Because the project of legal interpretation is always an attempt to be faithful to a binding 
original source, to hold that contradictory interpretations are equally valid would be self-
contradictory, an abandonment of their binding foundation.  Contradiction in interpretation ought 
to be overcome, but only by mutual submission to the original, not by labeling one interpretation 
“authoritative.”  See supra note 2. 
 14. “[Later] decisions put Griswold in proper perspective.  Griswold may no longer be read 
as holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple’s use of contraceptives.  Read in 
the light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual 
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”  Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)).  Of course, this is an example of horizontal stare decisis.  If a prior interpretation bound 
only the lower courts, not the highest court itself, then escape back to the original could be 
possible for that upper court.  But see text infra at note 123 for problems that even vertical stare 
decisis can generate for the highest court. 
 15. No matter how skillful a group of translators may be, they will inevitably distance 
themselves from the original if (for each new language in a series of translations of the original) 
they seek only to translate their latest translation, rather than attempting once again to be faithful 
to the original. 
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generated by the fact that each new legal interpretation normally will be 
applied retroactively to non-party events that have already occurred, thus 
surprising those who did not anticipate the change.16 
Indeed, if binding interpretation of law is a necessity for public order, 
it has become so only relatively recently.  The history of continental 
European law is, in fact, marked by repeated rejection of the idea that those 
who apply the law should seek to follow someone else’s apparently 
incorrect interpretation of that law rather than the law itself. 
The great scholars who rediscovered and exposited Justinian’s Roman 
texts had immense prestige in the late medieval and early modern periods, 
and they had enormous influence on the development of modern Romano-
Germanic legal systems.  But legal uniformity came about by 
argumentative and political persuasion.  Judges were not legally bound to 
follow scholars’ interpretations.17  After the modern European codes were 
adopted, scholars continued to have great impact as the chief interpreters of 
these new primary sources of law, but those scholars’ interpretations never 
displaced the codes as a matter of law. 
If even the scholarly leaders of the law in continental Europe never 
acquired binding authority, we would not expect the much-less-prestigious 
judiciary to do so.  And they clearly did not. The core tradition of Europe, 
unlike that of Great Britain, rejected the idea of stare decisis and other 
doctrines that could lead to a government of judges.  Traditional French 
 
 16. Americans are accustomed to thinking of stare decisis as adding greater certainty to the 
law, because it often adds specificity to prior general terms.  But if one conceives this doctrine to 
permit retroactive legislation at any time on any subject, albeit often narrowly tailored, its 
disruptive potential becomes readily apparent.  For example, if a judge were to hold three 
witnesses necessary for a valid will (rather than just two, as previously required), he might 
surprise and bind not only a litigant but also many others who had thought their estates wholly in 
order.  A court may occasionally make its rulings only prospective, thus protecting such reliance 
interests on old law—except, in order to avoid stating mere obiter dictum, for those of the losing 
party in the case at hand.  But a court will do so only where it thinks those interests sufficient to 
outweigh the harm done by the court’s overt departure from the role of an even-handed applier of 
preexisting law.  For more detail, see WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE CONTROL OF SUNBURSTS: 
TECHNIQUES OF PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING (1967). 
 17. Aphorisms such as “Chi non ha Azo non vada a Palazzo” and “Nemo jurista nisi 
Bartolista” do indicate a strong de facto influence of legal scholarship in European courts and 
doctrine.  But the very fact that such quips were thought useful tends to show that Azo and 
Bartolus did not bind de jure.  No one would think it clever to remark “Whoever does not have 
laws on his side should not go to court.”  This is not to deny that a legislative authority could 
declare selected scholars’ works to be legally binding.  Cf. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF 
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 40-41 (Tony Weir trans., 1995) (discussing the authority of Azo and 
Accursius); cf. also Donald R. Kelley, Jurisconsultus Perfectus: The Lawyer as a Renaissance 
Man, 51 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 84, 87-89 (1988) (both discussing the influence of 
Bartolus during the Renaissance); Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light?, Learning and 
Lawmaking in the History of German Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481, 487 n.23 (2005). 
35.3 STITH ARTICLE - MCCARTHY FINAL 2/22/2008  2:37 PM 
410 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:3 
doctrine and practice are perhaps the clearest in refusing to treat judicial 
interpretations as infallible or legally binding: “The highest courts of each 
[French] judicial system meet resistance from below, and this may well 
cause them to reverse their original opinions.  Uniformity is not as highly 
valued as correctness in the legal system as a whole . . . .”18 
Put simply, it has long made perfect sense in Europe to say that one or 
all courts are mistaken in their interpretations of a code or of another source 
of law.  Under the strange doctrine of “binding interpretation,” such talk 
would be almost as senseless as saying that a legislature’s statutes are 
erroneous.  A legally binding interpretation is a secondary source turned 
into a primary source.  It is the law itself.  It therefore cannot be mistaken 
about the law. 
The famous quip by England’s Bishop Hoadly captures what surely 
must be a central reason for the traditional European fear of binding 
interpretation: “[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken laws, it is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and 
purposes and not the person who first wrote or spake them.”19  Anyone who 
cares a great deal about a text or custom will not permit it to be displaced 
by an interpreter.  Either because the law embodies natural rights, or 
because it embodies the will of the people, or because it gives rise to 
private expectations, or for other reasons, Europeans have been 
“legalists”20 in that they have sought to be loyal to the law even at the cost 
of continuing disunity as to its meaning. 
America, too, has lived long and well without much uniformity of law. 
The vast majority of everyday issues (criminal, contract, tort, property, and 
the like) are dependent upon rules that may change at the border of each 
state. These differences often arise because of varying interpretations of the 
same legal principles. Moreover, there has long been a special resistance to 
the idea of binding judicial interpretation of the federal Constitution.21  One 
reason is obvious.  The dangers of binding interpretation are far more acute 
 
 18. JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 53 (1992).  But cf. id. at 48-56 (the 
developing interpretive hegemony of the Constitutional Council). 
 19.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994).  See also JOHN CHIPMAN 
GRAY, THE NATURE AND THE SOURCES OF THE LAW, 102-03, (photo. reprint 1983) (Roland 
Gray ed., 2d ed. 1921) (further discussion on Hoadly’s assertion). 
 20. Franz Wieacker has called “personalism,” “legalism,” and “intellectualism” the three 
invariables in European legal culture.  Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 
38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 19-27 (Edgar Bodenheimer trans. & ann. 1990). 
 21. See supra notes 6-7.  The United States Supreme Court considers its interpretations of 
constitutional law to be less binding than its interpretations of statutes: “Our willingness to 
reconsider our earlier decisions has been ‘particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such 
cases correction through legislative action is practically impossible.’”  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
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where it claims to be based on an authority that cannot easily be changed.  
Courts can achieve much more permanent ascendancy over hard-to-amend 
sources of law than they can over most statutes22 and over readily 
amendable constitutions.  The American President Thomas Jefferson once 
wrote that the “opinion which gives the judges the right to decide [the 
meaning of the Constitution for the Legislative and Executive branches of 
government] would make the judiciary a despotic branch.”23  President 
Abraham Lincoln, in his first inaugural address in 1861, warned that if “the 
policy of the Government is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
Supreme Court the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between 
parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own 
rulers.”24  These men saw clearly that the doctrine of binding constitutional 
interpretation can lead to unchecked tyranny.  Fidelity to the Constitution 
may require resistance to a Court that acts unconstitutionally.25 
 
 22. Where statutes themselves are difficult to change, their interpreter likewise has great 
power.  Thus a binding interpretation of a venerated code could have staying power even if 
widely considered mistaken.  Again, the interpretation of statutes (called “regulations” or 
“directives” in European Union parlance) by the European Court of Justice has a hegemonic 
quality inasmuch as a statutory clarification requires both an initiative by the Commission and a 
supermajority in the Council of Ministers. 
 23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 310-11 (P. Ford ed. 1897), as found in PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 70-71 (1975). 
 24. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 221 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Library of America 
1989).  See infra note 115 for full text of Lincoln’s remarks. 
 25. Note that although the U.S. Constitution proclaims itself “supreme,” it does not 
explicitly designate its own official interpreter.  See supra notes 6-7.  In some nations there may 
be an added complication.  Where the constitution itself clearly binds all to a certain court’s 
interpretations, how could that court ever be plausibly resisted in the name of the constitution?  
The answer may be that the power to interpret is not the power to amend.  Thus, if the court 
sought to amend the constitution under the guise of mere interpretation, fidelity to the 
constitutional order could still require resistance to the court.  This was the argument made by the 
Constitutional Court of Germany, threatening resistance to the European Court of Justice should 
its official interpretations permit disguised amendments to the Treaty of European Union. 
[I]n future, it will have to be noted as regards interpretation of enabling provisions by 
Community institutions and agencies that the Union Treaty as a matter of principle 
distinguishes . . . the amending of the Treaty, so that its interpretation may not have 
effects that are equivalent to an extension of the Treaty. Such an interpretation of 
enabling rules would not produce any binding effects for Germany. 
Brunner and Others v. the European Union Treaty (The Maastricht Judgment), 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court, 2d Senate] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 (F.R.G.), Case 2 BvR 2134/92 & 
2159/92, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 105 (1994), 1993 WL 965303, at *105.  Compare the subsequent speech 
by Prof. Paul Kirchhof, the primary author of the Brunner decision: 
If, in an adjudication of the European Court of Justice, the judges were not only to 
apply their judicial skill in interpreting the treaty but also extended the latter in some 
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One might summarize the argument so far in this way: The “rule of 
law” is a valuable ideal.  In order to secure the “rule” part of this ideal, in 
order to make sure law rules, it seems at first sight sensible to entrust the 
law to a supreme tribunal.  But if this trust is abused, there emerges the 
frightening possibility of rule without law, i.e., of judicial despotism.  Both 
in Europe and in America, there have been important efforts to avoid this 
result by preserving the possibility of legal dissent, of legally significant 
disagreement with interpretations of the law made by the courts. 
Is it enough, however, to do as Jefferson and Lincoln have 
suggested—i.e., to recognize the right of the legislative or executive 
branches of government to resist a judiciary that is unconstitutionally 
despotic?  It is certainly conceivable that the same political faction could 
come to dominate all three branches of government and that all three could 
connive at undermining a constitution.  Professor Sanford Levinson has 
argued for “citizen review” as a backup to judicial review.  He reasons that 
ultimately the only guarantee that the appointed enforcers of the 
Constitution will not subvert it lies in private citizens themselves 
scrutinizing judicial and other official acts for unconstitutionality and 
refusing cooperation with those that are egregiously illegal: “[C]itizen 
review is a vital necessity for any polity that purports to call itself 
constitutional.”26  No doubt remembering the Nazi capture of all state 
institutions, Germany has made citizen resistance to unconstitutional acts 
of judges and others an explicit constitutional right, if the constitutional 
order itself is at stake and if no other recourse is available.  Article 20(4) of 
the Basic Law declares “[A]ll Germans have the right to resist any person 
or persons seeking to abolish [the] constitutional order, should no other 
remedy be possible.”  The rule of law in Germany includes the right to 
resist all rulers in the name of law.27 
 
substantive respect, this legal instrument would not be valid on German territory . . . .  
The [European] Court of Justice develops European law further, the national courts 
make sure that the application of European law does not overstep the limits on 
interpretation and does not represent a de facto amendment to the treaty . . . .  
[Furthermore, if] a provision of the treaty cannot be adequately defined, it remains non-
binding. 
Paul Kirchhof, The Functions of the European Court of Justice and of the Courts of the Member 
States, in ROUNDTABLE ON THE DEVELOPMENT ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 
(European Policy Forum/ Frankfurter Institut May 12, 1995). 
 26. LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 53. 
 27. The context of this provision suggests that resistance could be against all three branches 
of government, including the judiciary.  The prior subsection, Article 20(3), reads “Legislation 
shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law 
and justice.”  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(3) (F.R.G.). 
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But if the elevation of “rule” over “law” was frightening, is not the 
elevation of “law” over “rule” likewise to be feared?  If citizen fidelity to 
rulers avoids disorder at the price of possible tyranny, citizen fidelity to the 
law avoids tyranny at the price of possible anarchy.  What if many 
radicalized Germans were to conclude that the present legal regime is 
unconstitutional as a whole?  The explicit permission to resist could 
conceivably contribute to the creation of chaos.28 
Who’s afraid of the “rule of law”?  The answer should be “all of us.”  
For this self-contradictory idea leads both to unchecked concentration of 
power and to unchecked decentralization of power, both of which are 
fearful possibilities. 
II. Infallibility as Consolation 
There is only one conceptually possible way to escape completely the 
conundrum we have been examining.  The essential reason that the rule of 
law tends to degenerate into tyranny or disorder is the indeterminate nature 
of interpretation, which subjects all interpreters to the possibility of error 
and the temptation of manipulation.  If only one final interpreter exists, the 
indeterminacy of interpretation makes despotism possible; if many exist, 
then disorder can arise.  On the other hand, if interpretation were infallibly 
correct, neither scenario would pose a danger, no matter how few or how 
many individuals were given final interpretive power.29 
The nature of our problem can perhaps best be seen through a 
religious analogue.  As the same Professor Levinson has pointed out,30 the 
relation of Christians to the Bible is in many ways similar to the relation of 
citizens to a constitution.  The Bible is, so to speak, the Constitution of 
Christianity.  But who has the power finally to interpret the Bible?  
Protestant Christians may point out that if the Pope is the final interpreter, 
he can manipulate Scripture for his own ends—making himself a tyrant.  
 
 28. Perhaps for this reason, Ukraine finally rejected such an explicit provision in its new 
Constitution.  The Ukrainian draft Constitution of 20 February 1996 had contained (in Article 14) 
a more cautiously worded version of the German Constitutional Article 20(4). 
 29. There might seem to be another way to ground binding interpretation, besides 
infallibility.  One strand in European legal thought would make the legislator the “authentic” 
interpreter of his own past proclamations. For example, the current code of canon law in the 
Roman Catholic Church states “[t]he legislator authentically interprets laws . . . .”  Canon 16 §1, 
1983 CIC [Codex Iuris Canonici].  But this appearance would be an illusion, for any 
“interpretation” by the legislator necessarily has the same rank as the original and so can simply 
be considered new legislation.  Thus, in any legal tradition, if an amendment appended to a 
constitution read: “Article I of this Constitution forbids discrimination by race,” its binding 
quality would come from the force of the re-constituting process, not from the force of the 
original Article I; it need not even be thought to be an interpretation of Article I. 
 30. Levinson, supra note 6. 
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Catholic Christians may respond that if every believer follows sola 
Scriptura (“Scripture alone,” the Bible as sole authority), without relying 
on hierarchical authority, Christianity will be forever shattered by 
multitudinous interpretations. 
In response to Protestant fear of the Pope, Catholics have pointed to 
papal infallibility.  When the Pope deals with fundamental religious 
matters, his interpretations are said to be infallible by the grace of God.31  
Protestants do not have quite so decisive a comeback.  They cannot claim 
that God leads every individual Bible reader infallibly to the truth, because 
the fact that many readers strongly disagree means they cannot all be right.  
But Protestants may suggest that a truly humble and prayerful believer will, 
with the Holy Spirit’s help, apply the Bible correctly to the situation at 
hand. 
Since few of us believe that the Holy Spirit guides secular law 
interpreters to the right results, it might seem that no one would propose 
infallibility as a solution to our antinomy with regard to positive law.  And, 
indeed, no one to my knowledge has ever claimed that every citizen will 
inevitably understand a nation’s law correctly.  But, most curiously, the 
claim of infallibility—or something very close to it—has seemed often 
plausible with regard to the interpretations of high courts.  For example, it 
has been asserted that when the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the old 
Soviet Union issued “binding interpretations,” it neither added to nor 
subtracted from the law, but only explained the true meaning that should 
already have been clear to a careful reader.32  The standard presumption of 
the United States Supreme Court—that it has merely discovered the true 
meaning of the Constitution—is quite similar,33 though it is belied by the 
fallibility revealed by that Court’s self-overrulings.  (If the Court itself 
 
 31. Cf. secs. 2034-35, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (speaking of the charisma of 
infallibility). 
 32. Professor Christopher Osakwe has made such a claim, writing: 
These guiding interpretations are an application of the real meaning of the law or of an 
individual norm of law but do not in themselves create a new legal norm.  In these 
guiding explanations is contained such understanding of the operative norms which in 
actual practice ought to have been followed even without such explanations.  Such 
explanations are generally given if and when a legal norm is differently understood and 
applied by the courts.  They do not add anything to the norm, nor do they detract from 
it.  They merely define its true contents. 
Contemporary Soviet Criminal Law: An Analysis of the General Principles and Major 
Institutions of Post-1958 Soviet Criminal Law, 6 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437, 442 n.20 (1976). 
 33. Justice Marshall, in the original case asserting the Supreme Court’s power of judicial 
review over a certain sort of congressional legislation, seemed to assume that the Court 
understood the true meaning of the Constitution, for he argued only for the supremacy of the 
Constitution, not for the supremacy of the Court.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803). 
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declares that it has made a mistake, then it necessarily has done so—either 
in its first interpretation or in its declaration that the prior interpretation was 
mistaken.)  And quite a few of my law students, in the United States and 
abroad, have argued that well-trained and carefully selected legal experts 
appointed to a high court are relatively unlikely to make a mistake about 
the basic meaning of a law or a constitution.  Though Americans rarely use 
the term today,34 “legal science” appears to be these students’ substitute for 
the Holy Spirit, protecting juridical scientists from the confusions and 
temptations to which ordinary mortals are subject. 
There is no a priori reason not to think my students’ confidence 
justified.  Even if well-chosen legal experts were not as fully infallible as 
the Pope is said to be, they could be relatively trustworthy.  If they were 
right or correct (in the sense of selecting the wisest interpretation of the 
law) in nearly every case, or perhaps even if they were just better 
interpreters than those who criticize them, we would arguably be doing the 
best we can in giving them final interpretive power.  If years of specialized 
training, followed by a careful appointment process, were required for 
accurate Shakespearean interpretation, we might well decide to treat the 
consensus of the holders of university Chairs of Shakespearean Studies as 
the last word in the field. This would amount to a kind of vertical stare 
decisis. 
Let us, then, ask ourselves whether we can, without self-deception, 
fairly hope that future members of high courts will be likely to be faithful 
to the law entrusted to them. 
One clarification may be necessary before we begin.  No one doubts 
that legal experts are masters of a range of esoteric terminology not 
accessible to lay persons.  But even if we assumed (incorrectly, of course) 
that those experts appointed to a supreme or constitutional court were the 
most learned and least biased in the nation, such expert and impartial 
mastery of vocabulary would not in itself guarantee better decisions than 
those reachable even by uneducated and opinionated lay people.  The 
 
 34. In the nineteenth century, the term “legal science” was still widely used in the United 
States.  David Dudley Field, the largely unsuccessful advocate of codification, found certitude in 
this idea: 
The science of law is our great security against the maladministration of justice.  If the decision of 
litigated questions were to depend upon the will of the Judge or upon his notions of what was 
just, our property and our lives would be at the mercy of a fluctuating judgment, or of caprice.  
The existence of a system of rules and conformity to them are the essential conditions of all free 
government, and of republican government above all others.  The law is our only sovereign. 
MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SCIENCE, AN ADDRESS AT THE OPENING OF THE LAW 
SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, September 31, 1859, reprinted in STEPHEN B. 
PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 812, 816  
(6th ed. Thomson/West 2006) (1884). 
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crucial question is whether expert knowledge, “legal science,” determines 
interpretation.  If special expertise only adds layers of complication to legal 
arguments, without making one choice more obvious to intelligent and fair-
minded observers, it is not more trustworthy after all.  Suppose one were 
having trouble deciding whether to order coffee or tea.  If a linguistic 
expert at the table were to say “Wait!  Let me explain how to express your 
choice in five different ways in each of three different languages,” should 
one stop and listen to him? 
III. Can High Courts be Trusted To Be Faithful to the Law in 
the Twenty-First Century? 
The above question does not posit some sort of possible degeneration 
in human nature.  Let us assume in fact that judges in the future will be just 
as humanly good or bad as they have been in the past.  The problem 
brought into focus below is not one of increasingly malevolent judicial 
motivation but of increasingly vague judicial standards.  New ideas of the 
nature of interpretation as well as new ideas of the nature of a constitution 
discourage judges from any strong attempt at fidelity to a text or other 
source of law. 
The story of interpretation in the twentieth century was largely one of 
evolution from supposedly non-political legal scientism or conceptualism 
to overtly result-oriented judicial activism or nominalism.  That is, the 
notion gained ground that concepts cannot be true or false, that they do not 
necessarily refer to any given reality,35 and therefore that legal rules (which 
are made up of concepts) can or should or must be used to generate 
whatever results a final interpreter of the rules wishes and can get away 
with. Without firm concepts, convention is too weak to stabilize meaning.  
Thus to state “the law” on any particular subject is and can be only to 
predict what that final interpreter will say the law is.36 
This philosophy is “nominalist” in that it treats legal categories merely 
as names (“nomina” in Latin), i.e., as labels that can be attached or 
 
 35. Note, however, that there was some resistance to this trend.  Contemporary philosophers 
have contended that there are some “natural kinds” to which our concepts conform.  See S. 
KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1980).  Philosophers of 
law have also disagree that concepts are indeterminate.  See, e.g., Michael Moore, Law as a 
Functional Kind, in, NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert George ed., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992), or, for a more traditional defense of legal concepts, JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980). 
 36. O.W. Holmes, Jr., was among the first to reason this way.  In 1897, he wrote: “The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law.”  10 HARV. L. REV. 457.  Karl Llewellyn later derided “the theory that rules decide 
cases.”  The Constitution as Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1934). 
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unattached at will, so that words have no inherent reference to any 
particular facts.  However, in America, it has long gone under the ironic 
name of “Legal Realism.”37 For purposes of this Article on interpretation, it 
might perhaps better be called “non-interpretivism,”38 since, at least in its 
extreme forms, it holds that interpretation as a form of faithfulness is 
impossible. The meaning of the law (the connection of its words/concepts 
to any given reality) exists only in the mind of its interpreters, not in the 
law itself.  If so, then as an early Realist concluded, “The ideal of a 
government of laws and not of men is a dream.”39 
Legal Realism is unquestionably the dominant philosophy in United 
States law schools40 and was so for much of the past century.41  Admittedly, 
most law teachers42 do not spin out the radical consequences of their non-
interpretivism: the loss of the possibility of the rule of law, and with it the 
loss of human rights, democracy, personal security, and governmental 
legitimacy and stability.43  But this reticence may mean only, as their still 
less legalistic critic Roberto Unger has caustically pointed out, that they are 
like priests who have lost their faith but cling to their jobs.44 
 
 37. “Ironic” because, in the history of Western thought, philosophical “realism” took certain 
concepts to subsist in reality itself, rather than only in names, as philosophical “nominalism” 
held.  For more on Legal Realism, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III ed., et 
al. 1993).  For an excellent historical summary of this school, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE 
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY, 74-94, 159-77 (1973). 
 38. This term is used here in the wide sense found in Alexander and Solum, supra note 7 at 
1619, not in the narrower meaning developed by John Hart Ely in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980). 
 39. Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 
478- 479 (1928). 
 40. Bailey Kuklin and Jeffrey W. Stempel have averred that “we are all Realists” in America 
today.  FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 28 (1994). 
 41. Id.  However, PURCELL, supra note 37, at 159-77, points out that just before and after 
the confrontation with Nazism in World War II, Legal Realism came under attack for its 
skepticism and cynicism regarding the rule of law ideal. 
 42. For a discussion of Realism’s effect on teaching, see Richard Stith, Can Practice Do 
Without Theory?  Differing Answers in Western Legal Education, 80 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS-UND 
SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 426 (1994). 
 43. “Those who dismiss formalism as a naïve illusion, mistaken in its claims and pernicious 
in its effect, do not know what they are in for.  Their contempt is shallower than the doctrine they 
ridicule, for they fail to understand what the classical liberal thinkers saw earlier: the destruction 
of formalism brings in its wake the ruin of all other liberal doctrines of adjudication.” ROBERTO 
M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 92 (1975). 
 44. Speaking for himself and fellow radicals in the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
Harvard Law Professor Unger writes: “When we came, they were like a priesthood that had lost 
their faith and kept their jobs.  They stood in tedious embarrassment before cold altars.”  Roberto 
M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 675 (1983). 
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the question of 
whether conceptualism or nominalism is a more accurate description of the 
connection between mind and reality, between idea and being.  But it 
seems obvious that if future judges are increasingly taught only or mostly 
nominalism, that legal labels can and must be attached arbitrarily, they will 
be likely to feel free to apply texts as they wish.  In America at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is difficult for judges honestly to be 
anything other than non-interpretivists. 
It is true that much of the rest of the world has taken legal nominalism 
less seriously than the United States.  But this does not mean that American 
skepticism and cynicism will not spread to Europe and elsewhere in the 
twenty-first century—and not only because global communication is 
becoming exponentially more thorough and rapid each year.  Non-
conceptual jurisprudence and judicial activism acquired a bad name in 
Europe in the first half of this century by being associated with fascism and 
Nazism.45  Judges were urged to ignore the formal rules of law in order to 
secure the common good (as seen, of course, through the eyes of the then-
dominant ideologies).  But now over a half century has passed. 
Respected observers have long noted the fading of the legal science 
tradition in Europe,46 partly in response to U.S. Legal Realism.  John Henry 
Merryman, a prominent supporter of American-style legal practice, pointed 
out some time ago that 
 
German legal science has been the object of satire, ridicule, and 
direct attack by legal thinkers in Germany and elsewhere from the 
time of its emergence.  More recently . . . its critics have begun to 
have more effect.47 
 
Merryman went on to declare that a “fundamental readjustment”48 is 
occurring in the European legal tradition, making it in certain ways more 
like that of contemporary America. 
 
 45. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 360-61, 379 (Clarendon 
Press and Oxford University Press 1992). 
 46. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, 149-59 (1969).  With 
regard to France, Pierre Manent has averred: “The profound recent changes of the French 
constitutional system have been influenced by the American system and experience and the 
American debates about it. To put it simply, if there were no United States Supreme Court, there 
would, in France, be no constitutional [sic] Council or at least the French constitutional [sic] 
Council would not have acquired the powers it has acquired in recent years.” A WORLD BEYOND 
POLITICS?: A DEFENSE OF THE NATION-STATE 177 (Princeton University Press 2006). 
 47. MERRYMAN, supra note 46, at 155. 
 48. Id. at 156. 
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Disregard of rules in favor of results has enjoyed especial favor in 
Europe on the Left.  The “uso alternativo” of law in Spain, and a similar 
movement in Italy and Latin America, constituted a kind of “Legal 
Realism” more explicitly partisan than that found in the United States and 
still influential in civil law nations.49  One critic has summarized this 
attitude toward law as follows: 
 
All laws should be interpreted with this yardstick: partisanship is a 
virtue and neutrality a misconception or a fraud; so is independence; 
a judiciary cloaking itself with these sham values is a servant of 
power and ought to be told as much; judges must defend the 
oppressed and the down-trodden, cooperate with the labor movement 
. . .50 
 
Where Italian judges held these views, “For an employer to emerge from 
their hands as a winner was harder than for a camel to go through the eye 
of a needle.”51 
It cannot be assumed that so partisan an approach will not capture the 
highest court in the land.  Members of India’s Supreme Court, for example, 
have for some time been announcing their vision of an active judiciary. 
One has stated: 
 
It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and 
continually that our Constitution is not a non-aligned . . . charter. . . .  
The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic destination and a 
creative function.  It has . . . to become an arm of the socio-economic 
revolution and perform an active role. . . .  It cannot remain content 
to act merely as an umpire . . . .  [T]his approach to the judicial 
function may be all right for a stable and static society but not for a 
society pulsating with urges of gender justice, worker justice, 
minorities’ justice . . . .  [The judiciary] must become an active 
participant . . . through a proactive goal oriented approach.  But this 
cannot happen unless we have judicial cadres who share the fighting 
faith of the Constitution.52 
 
Another has asserted: “An activist role . . . is a sine qua non for the 
judiciary.  If value packing [of the courts] connotes appointment of [such] 
 
 49. ANTONIO-CARLOS PEREIRA MENAUT, LECCIONES DE TEORÍA CONSTITUCIONAL 262-64 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 50. See FREDERIC SPOTTS & THEODOR WIESER, ITALY: A DIFFICULT DEMOCRACY 158-61 
(1986). 
 51. Id. 
 52. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R.1982 S.C. 149, 197 (P.N. Bhagwati, J.). 
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persons otherwise well qualified . . . then not only the value packing is not 
to be frowned upon . . . but it must be advocated with a crusader’s zeal.”53  
In 1985, during his tenure as Chief Justice, P.N. Bhagwati commented that 
judges need not “feel shy or apologetic” about their “law creating roles”: 
 
The Supreme Court of India has been performing this role in the last 
7 or 8 years by wielding judicial power in a manner unprecedented in 
its history of over 30 years . . . .  The courts of India . . . started the 
legal aid movement . . . fostered the development of social-action 
groups . . . developed the strategy of public interest litigation. . . .  In 
the process [the Court] has rewritten some parts of the 
Constitution . . . contrary to the intent of the makers of the 
constitution.54 
 
New literary and philosophical movements also joined with American 
Legal Realism and the Left to create a certain synergism.  In the wake of 
European thinkers like Derrida55 and Lyotard,56 it became commonplace to 
deny that a literary text could have any meaning other than that constructed 
by its interpreters.  It would be odd not to apply such skepticism to legal 
texts as well. 
For these reasons—American influence, leftist politics, and general 
post-modern subjectivism—it is not realistic to imagine that even 
mainstream judges in Europe and elsewhere around the world will long 
continue in the tradition of conceptualist legal science.  The idea of a high 
court judge as a neutral and relatively infallible scientific expert is just not 
credible to many legal minds today, and judges are unlikely to seek to 
pursue what they and their peers regard as impossible or fraudulent.57  If 
judges are told they must be political—even if this assertion is 
philosophically still in doubt—they are likely to become political. 
The increasing contemporary skepticism about the objectivity of the 
process of interpretation means that trust in a supreme or constitutional 
court to apply the law correctly is more and more misplaced.  As belief in 
legal science fades, the only secular analogue to papal infallibility 
 
 53. Id. at 446 (Prabodhbhai D. Desai, J.). 
 54. Judicial Activism in India, 17(1) GARGOYLE 6, 7-8 (2002). 
 55. See generally, JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., Johns Hopkins Press 1976). 
 56. See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT 
ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., University of Minnesota Press 
1979). 
 57. Those peers are likely to be increasingly transnational, according to the impressive facts 
and arguments marshaled in ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004).  
Global communities of judges are emerging and are affecting the substance of the law. 
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disappears.  To grant any court binding power to interpret the law is thus to 
secure only order, not some preexisting law. 
This conclusion concerning changing views of interpretation can be 
buttressed by pointing to changing views of the nature of constitutions and 
of the courts that interpret them. 
Here, the United States is actually lagging behind Europe in the 
degree of freedom granted to its highest court.  Modern European courts 
have been influenced by the work of Hans Kelsen, who in the 1920s first 
argued for a special court to enforce the constitution.58  Kelsen viewed 
constitutional law as inherently “political law.”  It needed to be kept out of 
the ordinary courts both in order to prevent a “government of judges” and 
in order to preserve the relatively non-political legitimacy of these courts.  
But by the same token, the members of a constitutional court are thus 
expected to be political.59 
Then, too, in the very heart of old Romano-Germanic formalist 
Europe, there has arisen an almost incomparably activist Court.  The Van 
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastinge and Costa v. 
ENEL decisions of the European Community’s European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), arguing that greater uniformity would be a useful effect, an effet 
utile, managed to transform international duties into national disabilities.60  
The Court made member state disobedience to European law not just 
wrong but impossible, a court-led revolution that created a new “Rule of 
Recognition” (Hart)61 or “Grundnorm” (Kelsen)62 for every nation in the 
European Community (EC).  Furthermore, the ECJ has mandated that 
 
 58. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE, 34-37 (1999); Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected Judicial Review—and Why It 
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. Rev. 2744, 2765-72 (2003).  See also Pereira Menaut, supra note 
49, at 296. 
 59. So, for example, it is considered appropriate for constitutional interpretations by the 
Constitutional Court of Germany to “try to create an integrative effect with regard to the various 
parties to a constitutional dispute as well as to social and political cohesion.”  Winfried Brugger, 
Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks from a 
German Point of View, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 396 (1994). However, by candidly recognizing 
the political nature of constitutional courts, Kelsen also helped to make such tribunals more easily 
subject to political control, e.g., through a clearly politicized process for selecting their term-
limited members. Sweet (2003), supra note 58. 
 60. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastinge, 1 E.C.R. 
(1963), 1963 CMLR 105; Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 585 E.C.R. (1964), 1964 CMLR 425.  For 
more detailed arguments, see R. Stith, El problema del alto tribunal no razonable, in DOS 
VISIONES NORTEAMERICANAS DE LA JURISDICCIÓN DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 29-32 (Universidade 
de Santiago de Compostela 2000). 
 61. H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d Ed. 1994). 
 62. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 
Harvard University Press 1949) (1945). 
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national courts join it in reasoning according to effet utile, i.e., in 
interpreting the law to say whatever is useful for it to say.63  The European 
Community has thus spread Kelsen’s “political law” in ways that he would 
not have expected: to a single supreme court (for the EC has no separate 
constitutional court) and even to all the ordinary national courts of Europe, 
who are forced to imitate the methodology of the ECJ.64 
Moreover, even though the interpretive freedom and activism of the 
United States Supreme Court once led a prominent law school dean to 
suggest approvingly that it is the American analogue to a Communist 
nation’s “central committee,”65 the American constitution is still conceived 
of primarily as a set of negative limits on state and federal governmental 
powers, not as a program of positive requirements operative in all spheres 
of public activity.66  Like a criminal code, that fundamental law results 
almost exclusively in prohibitions on action, not in duties to act.  For 
example, according to the United States Supreme Court, the Constitution 
prohibits states from banning abortion, even in the last weeks of fetal 
development, whenever an abortion is necessary to preserve a mother’s 
“health,” broadly defined.67  But at the same time, a legislature may refuse 
to fund even medically-indicated abortions, out of concern for the fetus.68  
 
 63. Stith, supra note 60. 
 64. In Case 106/89, Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentatcion, 1990 
E.C.R. I-4135, for example, the ECJ required the Spanish courts to reinterpret Spain’s hundred-
year-old Civil Code in line with the purpose of a still-unimplemented Community directive.  In 
addition, national constitutional courts, and later the ECJ, have begun enforcing individual rights 
(contrary to Kelsen’s recommendation, for the often open nature of such rights increases the 
lawmaking capabilities of judges).  See SWEET, supra note 58.  Pierre Manent argues that our 
contemporary infatuation with the language of human rights is perhaps the primary force behind 
the growing worldwide power of judges, for “the declarations of human rights are nobler but 
much vaguer than national laws  
and constitutions. If one relies chiefly on human rights, there can be no ‘fixed way of judging’ 
. . . . [And] a power that discovers it can act arbitrarily will soon use and abuse this latitude. It 
tends toward despotism.”  Supra note 46, at 186-87. 
 65. William Ray Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A. J. 1212, 1216  
(1977). 
 66. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980). 
 67. After spelling out the right to post-viability abortions for maternal health reasons, Roe 
directs the reader to its companion case, Doe v. Bolton.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 
(1973).  Doe, in turn, indicates that the word “health” includes all factors—including 
“psychological” and “familial”—relevant to maternal wellbeing.  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
192 (1973).  In 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling upholding the Partial Birth 
Abortion Act despite the Act's failure to allow the banned procedure when necessary for the 
mother's health in a case called Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). However, Gonzales 
dealt only with abortions occurring during delivery.  The law of Roe for the nine months of 
intrauterine pregnancy was not changed. 
 68. See Harris, supra note 66. 
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In other words, the Court’s constitutional value preference (maternal 
freedom over fetal life) results only in a particular negative limitation on 
the State, not in a mandatory positive direction for state action. Not so in 
the Old World.  Many of the new constitutions of the twentieth century 
read like party platforms, proclaiming grand programs of social 
construction that the State has a duty to bring about.69  Because one can 
never really know what will be effective in the future, instrumental 
judgments can never be as certain as rules forbidding actions.  A high court 
undertaking to direct a positive constitutional program thus has far greater 
discretion than one asked only to enforce a list of negative prohibitions. 
An example of the divide between negative and positive rules can be 
seen in the two German constitutional decisions on abortion.70  In both 
cases, the judges agreed unanimously on the negative rule, that the fetus 
has a constitutional right not to be killed at any time during pregnancy.  
There would thus have been no dissent to holding only that the State itself 
may never act to kill a fetus.  But the Constitutional Court majority went on 
to design (and, in the second case almost twenty years later, to redesign) a 
mandatory plan of affirmative protection for fetal life, sparking the 
following dissent: 
 
As defense rights the fundamental rights have a comparatively clear 
recognizable content; in their interpretation and application, the 
judicial opinions have developed practicable, generally recognized 
criteria for the control of state encroachments—for example, the 
principle of proportionality.  On the other hand, it is regularly a most 
complex question, how a value decision is to be realized through 
affirmative measures of the legislature.  The necessarily generally 
held value decisions can be perhaps characterized as constitutional 
mandates which, to be sure, are assigned to point the direction for all 
state dealings but are directed necessarily toward a transposition of 
 
 69. Several examples of positive directive principles can be found in the current 
constitutions of Ireland, Mexico, Ukraine, Germany, Italy, India, and Spain; see e.g. SPANISH 
CONSTITUTION [C.E.] art. 43(3): “The public authorities shall foster health education, physical 
education and sports. Likewise, they shall encourage the proper use of leisure time.”  It is true 
that many of these are nominally non-justiciable (see infra note 94), but they may nevertheless be 
influential.  Some, such as those in the Constitution of Ukraine, are clearly intended to be 
justiciable.  See also MENAUT, supra note 49, at 369-82 (chapter authored by José Ignacio 
Martínez Estay). 
 70. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.) (translated in John D. 
Gorby & Robert E. Jonas, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. 
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605, 606 (1975-1976)) and Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[federal constitutional court] May 28, 1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[BVerfGE] 203 (F.R.G.).   
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binding regulations.  Based upon the determination of the actual 
circumstances, of the concrete setting of goals and their priority and 
of the suitability of conceivable means and ways, very different 
solutions are possible.  The decision, which frequently presupposes 
compromises and takes place in the course of trial and error, belongs, 
according to the principle of division of powers and to the 
democratic principle, to the responsibility of the legislature directly 
legitimatized by the people.71 
 
Insofar as emerging constitutional orders around the world contain positive 
mandates for state action,72 similarly wide discretion in constitutional 
interpretation is necessarily possessed by any court that has been given, or 
has taken upon itself, the duty to enforce that constitutional order.73 
Not only are the world’s emerging constitutions likely to contain 
positive duties, they are also likely to be interpreted in principled and 
programmatic ways.  The United States Constitution, again, is usually 
treated like a criminal code in that it limits state freedom only in certain 
fairly well-defined respects, not linked by principle or analogy.  These new 
constitutions, by contrast, are being interpreted much more like the classic 
civil codes—that is, as comprehensive regimes containing in principle the 
solution to every possible dispute.  New positive state and even private74 
duties are being discovered by analogy to old ones and the whole order is 
being arranged by the courts in a mandatory hierarchy of values governing 
all public action.  Spain’s Constitutional Tribunal has affirmed the 
implications of this new approach: 
 
It is also pertinent to make. . .some references to the scope, meaning 
and function of fundamental rights in the constitutionalism of our 
day inspired by the social State of Law. . . .  [F]undamental 
 
 71. [1975] 39 BVerfGE 1, id. at 71-72.  H. Jonas & J. Gorby trans., id. at 665-66 (1976) 
(emphasis in original).  For further discussion, in agreement with this dissenting opinion, see R. 
Stith, New Constitutional and Penal Theory in Spanish Abortion Law, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 
534-40 (1987). 
 72. E.g., UKRAINE CONST., supra note 5, art. 42 (rights of consumers), art. 43 (state’s duty 
to provide opportunities for safe employment), art. 47 (right to housing), art. 48 (right to 
satisfactory living standards) & art. 50 (right to a safe and healthy environment). See also supra 
note 69. 
 73. Constitutionally speaking, the Supreme Court of Ukraine could order economic 
reintegration with Russia, if the Court found this step the most effective way to protect the “rights 
of consumers” (art. 42), or “the right to work, including the right to have the possibility to earn 
one’s living by work which he/she chooses or agrees to freely” (art. 43).  By calling its order only 
an “interpretation” rather than a “change” of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
could claim not to transgress art. 157 (forbidding constitutional amendments tending to abolish 
Ukrainian independence). 
 74. This is what German constitutional theory calls Drittwirkung. 
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rights. . .are the legal expression of a system of values that, by 
decision of the framers, has to inform the whole legal and political 
organization. . . .  Consequently, from the obligation of all powers to 
submit to the Constitution, one deduces not only the negative 
obligation of the State not to injure the individual or institutional 
sphere protected by these fundamental rights, but also the positive 
obligation to contribute to the effectiveness of such rights, and of the 
values that they represent, even when a subjective claim does not 
exist. . . .75 
 
Under such a regime, it could easily be held that if the value of maternal 
freedom is constitutionally higher than the value of fetal life (as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has said),76 the State must not only permit abortion, it must 
also fund and otherwise support it.  Or (as has been averred in Germany)77 
if the value of fetal life is held to be higher than the value of human 
freedom, then the State must not only refrain from killing fetuses, it must 
also work effectively to protect them. 
If the “rule of law” means governance by previously announced 
descriptions of forbidden or permitted actions, it is hard to see how it could 
continue to coexist with a high court’s insistence on effectuating a wide 
range of valuable results.  After all, “effectiveness” (effet utile, in the words 
of the ECJ) sometimes requires violation of almost any rule.  Take the 
fundamental rule against killing another human being.  Does this rule 
forbid three starving men on a lifeboat to kill and eat a fourth?78 Perhaps 
not, for it could be argued that the rule against killing is an expression of 
the value of life and this value is promoted rather than hindered by 
cannibalism in this case—in that killing and eating the fourth person 
permits three to survive where four would otherwise perish.  A court 
requiring effective promotion of life could forbid punishment of the 
cannibals.79  Indeed, such a court could require punishment (for attempted 
murder of the would-be cannibals) of any sailor whose fears or qualms had 
 
 75. Decision of 11 April 1985, STC 53/1985, 1985-49 BJC 515, 532 (R. Stith trans). 
Galician law professor Antonio-Carlos Pereira Menaut quips: “One is tempted to deduce that 
good citizens should not start their day without asking what the Constitution decrees.”  A Plea for 
a Compound Res Publica Europea: Proposals for Increasing Constitutionalism without 
Increasing Statism, 18 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 75, 77 (2003). 
 76. See Roe, supra note 67. 
 77. See 25 February 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1; 28 May 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203; & 1975, 39 
BVerfGE 1, 71-72, supra notes 70 -71. 
 78. See, e.g., R. v. Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
 79. On the other hand, if a court decided (correctly, in my view) that the value underlying 
laws against murder were peace rather than the preservation of life, then it would not hold that 
killing in extremis promotes the value behind the rule against killing. 
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led him to try to stop the killing.  But would most citizens have noticed 
beforehand that “Thou shalt not kill” may mean “Thou mayest kill” or even 
“Thou shalt permit killing?”  Unlimited judicial instrumentalism is 
incompatible with governance by law. 
Some may discount the danger of judicial tyranny because they 
assume that a constitution could always be amended to rein in a maverick 
court.  But this is not necessarily so.  The amending process may be quite 
difficult, as in the United States.  Moreover, many constitutions contain 
significant limits to the amendatory power.80  And even without any 
explicit textual support, a high court given binding interpretative power 
over a constitution could well find some important tacit limits on 
amendments.  India’s Supreme Court has done just this—successfully 
holding unconstitutional various amendments affecting some undefined 
“basic structure” of the constitution81—without any explicit textual support 
in that document. 
Amending the constitution, furthermore, relies on politics to remedy 
judicial overreaching, and providing ready political remedies (such as a 
very easy amendment process or quite limited judicial terms and a 
politicized process of appointment to the courts) is also worrisome.  The 
problem is that political resistance to judicial politics might well not be 
made in the name of fidelity to law and constitution.  The body politic 
might not seek to restore the legal order by opposing the acts of a faithless 
high court.  It might just decide to make new law.  Indeed, it might so 
decide even if it thought that court to have been faithful to the original law 
or constitution.  In other words, facilitating political resistance may weaken 
judicial tyranny, may make courts more closely follow the election returns, 
without leading a nation back to the rule of law.  Political remedies might 
induce a court to be popular rather than law abiding, or they might instead 
let a court feel free to be capricious, confident that any serious mistakes 
 
 80. Ukraine, for example, would not permit amendments that would “aboli[sh] or restrict 
human and civil rights and freedoms,” so a Court holding that the rights of consumers and 
laborers required partial reintegration with Russia would not have to defer to a contrary 
constitutional amendment. UKRAINE CONST., art. 157 (1996).  The 1990 Nepal Constitution 
forbade any amendments that violated “the spirit of the Preamble.”  NEPAL CONST., art. 116(1).  
See constitutions of Ukraine and Nepal, supra note 5.  See also R. Stith, The Extraordinary 
Counter-Majoritarian Power of the New Supreme Court of Nepal, 4 ASIA L. REV. 38 (New Delhi 
1995); reprinted with minor revisions as Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The 
Extraordinary Power of Nepal’s Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47-77 (1996). 
 81. Stith, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, supra note 80, at 57-69. The 
attorney general of India once quipped that trying to determine what the Supreme Court means by 
“basic structure” is like “a blind man in a dark room searching for a black cat which is not there.” 
Women's Rally on Violence, HINDUSTANI TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991. 
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would be reined in.  This Article, however, seeks to find ways not only to 
prevent judicial despotism but also to secure the rule of law. 
Others may try an ad hominem escape to avoid facing up to the 
dangers for the rule of law posed by courts given binding interpretive 
power.  It might be said “But our judges just are not that sort of person.  
We know them.  They would never be so aggressive.”  This statement, 
indeed, would be quite true of judges appointed and promoted in traditional 
European ways.  In most Romano-Germanic countries, there is a judicial 
career track open to recent law school graduates.  Because judges do their 
work relatively anonymously in Europe, those choosing this path tend to be 
persons satisfied with a secluded life, and, as they are gradually promoted 
to senior positions by their superiors, they carry with them a kind of 
deferential psychology.82  By contrast, important American courts are 
staffed laterally from among those who have already been successful as 
hard-driving and well-connected lawyers, law professors, or politicians.  
Having been leaders before judicial appointment or election, they are 
unlikely to become deferential followers of legislators once on the Bench.  
A well-known American federal appellate court judge (who requested 
anonymity) once remarked that the root cause of judicial activism in the 
United States is not liberalism or conservatism or any other political “ism.”  
The “ism” that drives judicial activism in America is the “metabolism” of 
those placed on the Bench. 
Courts around the world with the power of binding constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement are not staffed only, or even primarily, by 
those with a traditionally tranquil European judicial mentality and level of 
energy.83  Instead, lateral appointments of proven legal leaders may be 
made, á la americaine.84  American-style appointments are likely to result 
in American-style judicial activism—and more, given the new and more 
expansive concept of a constitution found today outside the United States. 
It is clear, therefore, that any grant to a high court of binding power to 
interpret and enforce the law cannot be justified by the assumption that the 
court will be quasi-infallible or otherwise derive its decisions in some kind 
of objective scientific way from legal texts and traditions.  Both the process 
of interpretation and the meaning of a constitution have today become so 
 
 82. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 4, at 155-56, 158-59. 
 83. Id. at 159. 
 84. In the Ukraine constitution, no judicial experience at all is required for appointment to 
the proposed Constitutional Court—only the age of forty years, higher legal education, and ten 
years of professional experience.  See UKRAINE CONST. supra note 5, at ch. 12, art. 148. 
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politicized that no thoughtful observer can fail to recognize the potential for 
tyranny in centralized judicial power.85 
But is there any alternative, other than total disorder?  The answer is 
yes, as we shall see below.  The “rule of law” need not require a choice 
between one supreme ruler or no ruler at all.  Multiple rulers—in other 
words, interpretive pluralism—may provide a secure foundation for the 
rule of law. 
IV. The Theory and Practice of Interpretive Pluralism 
The theoretical problem we face can be quite simply restated.  A 
fallible interpreter can obscure or obliterate the law to the degree that its 
interpretations thereof are final.  Finality itself has two components.  A 
given court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the law to the extent that 
(1) it can review all other interpreters and (2) it is not itself reviewable by 
any other interpreter.  Its monopoly of interpretive power is broken if either 
the first or the second component of finality is weakened. 
“Separation of powers” is an appropriate name for divisions that 
counter the first bulwark of high court supremacy.  If an otherwise final 
court is deprived of the power to review certain other institutions’ 
interpretations of the law, or if its jurisdiction is reduced in scope, then 
concentration of interpretative power at the apex of a single pyramid has 
been eliminated.  Multiple final interpreters have replaced a single such 
interpreter, making it more difficult for a single idiosyncratic and 
unpersuasive political view to be forced by a few upon the entire law.  For 
example, by eliminating any appeal to a central supreme or constitutional 
court, the highest court in each state of a federation could have final 
authority over the meaning of the federal constitution within that particular 
state. Or a constitution might assign to the legislature the interpretation of 
the limits on legislation and to the judiciary the interpretation of the 
procedures for the conviction of crimes, with each branch required to 
accept the other’s interpretation of its assigned portion of the constitution.86 
 
 85. For additional empirical confirmation of this thesis, see, e.g., C. NEAL TATE & 
TORBJORN VALLINDER, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1995); ROBERT BORK, 
COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY (2004). 
 86. Separation of powers would seem to require some ability of each branch to invalidate 
the acts of other branches of government in order to protect this very separation, in order to 
protect its own jurisdiction. (If not, separation of powers may collapse into the unreviewable 
supremacy of the boldest power.)  Put another way, separation of powers, as used in this Article, 
construes the law or constitution to impose only duties on each branch, not disabilities, so long as 
that branch remains within its jurisdiction.  It is disabled, however, from acting ultra vires so as to 
nullify the appointed powers and duties of the other branches of government. Arguably, Justice 
Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was “departmentalist” 
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As we shall see, there are many more modes that can be, and have been, 
developed for the separation of interpretive powers. 
“Checks and balances” is an appropriate term for the second manner 
of cutting back on an excessive concentration of interpretive power.  Even 
if a supreme or constitutional court successfully claims the power to review 
all other interpreters of the law, its own interpretations need not be 
accepted as binding, i.e., as final, by each of those others.  Separation of 
powers weakens a court by restricting review; checks and balances 
achieves a similar result by expanding review, making it mutual or 
coordinate.  The court can review others, but they can review it, too.  For 
example, a president might refuse to execute supreme court decisions that 
she considered unconstitutional. Perverse interpretation of the law is made 
less likely by increasing the number of persons who can refuse to cooperate 
with apparently unfaithful interpretations.87  Here, again, a number of 
variations that are important in theory and in practice will be explored 
below.88 
 
in this separation-of-powers sense, in that he simply recognized a disability in Congress to alter a 
constitutionally-assigned Supreme Court jurisdiction.  He need not be read as claiming that the 
Court could nullify acts of Congress that did not encroach upon the Court—i.e., he need not be 
read to make a broad claim of judicial power to check and balance Congress.  See Clinton, supra 
note 6.  For a different solution to the problem of preserving separation, see infra note 108 and 
accompanying text. 
 87. If this “checks and balances” approach were to treat every legal or constitutional duty as 
containing an equally extensive disability to breach that duty, which disability would require 
refusal of cooperation (with any attempted breach) by all other branches of government, everyone 
would be forced to do exactly the same interpretive job, second guessing every single 
interpretation by anyone else: a formula for utter stagnation.  So checks and balances is workable 
only if it is combined with a degree of separation of powers.  For example, different courts or 
other departments of government might review one another’s decisions only in cases of manifest 
error on quite significant matters, thus leaving the vast majority of daily business up to each 
separate entity.  Put theoretically, each branch’s duties would be much more extensive than its 
disabilities.  Each would be disabled, would act ultra vires, only in cases of egregious derelictions 
of duty, not of minor deviations from duty.  This is sometimes called “accommodation” or the 
allowance of “some discretion” or a “margin of appreciation.”  The German Constitutional Court 
has accordingly averred that it will put up with poor treaty “interpretations” by the European 
Court of Justice but not with treaty “amendments” disguised as interpretations, thus preserving a 
substantial division of labor between the two courts without giving up the right of review.  See 
supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
Another solution would be to construe review as a right but not a duty, so that other branches of 
government do not feel bound to respond to their neighbors’ errors.  Thus, for example, a 
legislature that disagreed with a court’s invalidation of one of its statutes could reenact that 
statute, and thus challenge the court, if it wished, but it need not do so.  Again, a third-instance 
appellate court could have the right to overturn lower court decisions that it thought wrong, 
without having the duty to do so (as is the case with most appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 88. I am particularly indebted to CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (rev. ed. 1994) for much of the analysis below, although the terminology I use, and the 
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To return briefly to our religious analogue: The extremes of Catholic 
papal supremacy and Protestant individual disorder can be avoided if either 
different Christian churches can render independent interpretations of the 
Bible for their respective members, or those churches must mutually 
approve one another’s interpretations.  The Eastern Orthodox tradition has 
used elements of both approaches—incorporating both relative autonomy 
among patriarchates and the need for continuing mutual recognition by 
those same sister churches. 
A. Separation of Powers 
Turning first to separation of powers, two major sub-possibilities 
present themselves in theory.  The first involves giving certain legal actors 
the power to interpret the law for themselves, subject to no review at all of 
their interpretations.  The second involves subjecting legal actors to some 
review, but without concentrating that power of review ultimately in a 
single interpretive body. 
Many living examples of the first possibility can be adduced from 
throughout the world.  Limitations on standing come easily to mind: In the 
United States a legally cognizable stake in the outcome is required in order 
to raise a constitutional question;89 in France only certain named political 
entities may challenge a bill’s constitutionality;90 similarly in Ukraine, the 
constitution sharply restricts standing to raise constitutional issues to 
certain named officials and institutions.91  Where no one is able to request 
review, political and legal actors are free to interpret the law autonomously.  
On a more mundane level, a jury in a criminal trial in the United States is 
told to apply the law, but if the jury acquits, its interpretation of the law is 
subject to no review whatsoever.92 
More directly substantive is the exclusion of “political questions” 
from review by the United States Supreme Court; on such questions 
Congress is left to apply the Constitution to itself.93  Still more amply, the 
whole category of positive constitutional duties binding on the legislature 
 
solutions for which I argue, are not his.  See especially his discussion of “Alternatives to Judicial 
Review” at 90-96. 
 89. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 90. 1958 CONST. 61 (Fr.). 
 91. UKRAINE CONST., supra note 5, at  art. 150(1). 
 92. This is so because the state is not permitted to appeal a general verdict of “not guilty,” 
even where the jury has ignored the judge’s interpretation of the law. The jury thus checks the 
judge, while remaining itself unchecked.  See Thomas, supra note 7 (pointing out that jury 
behavior has sometimes been “regarded as an expression of faithfulness to the law (regardless of 
the authority of institutions or officeholders), rather than defiance of the law . . . .”). 
 93. See, e.g.,  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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may be unenforceable by the courts,94 thus leaving the legislative 
interpretation of those legal duties unreviewable (and avoiding much of the 
conflict between effectiveness and the rule of law discussed above).  In 
other words, some of a legislature’s constitutional duties may be subjected 
to interpretation and review by the highest court, and some not. 
Perhaps most widely known is the absence of judicial review of 
statutes for unconstitutionality in Great Britain.  Britain possesses a 
constitution, though not one reduced to a single document, but Parliament 
has the duty of policing itself for unconstitutionality, while the courts 
review administrative actions for the same.95  Nor is such separation of 
powers limited to countries with an unconsolidated constitution.  France 
has often had a unified written constitution along with limited or no review 
of legislation for constitutionality; its legislators have been subject only to 
the constitution itself, not to other human interpreters.96  Even today, 
French legislation once promulgated cannot be declared unconstitutional by 
any court or by any other tribunal.  The Constitutional Council in France 
can inhibit change in the law, by declaring new legislation invalid before it 
goes into effect, but cannot surprise the nation by overturning established 
laws.97  Ukraine’s constitution appears to immunize present law from 
review in a different way: Although the Constitutional Court may declare 
any law—old or new—unconstitutional, it may do so only prospectively.98  
 
 94. Such, for example, is at least nominally the rule found in the Constitution of India with 
regard to the long list of “directive Principles of State Policy.”  Article 37 declares that these 
principles “shall not be enforceable in any court.”  INDIA CONST. art. 37.  The Constitution of 
Ireland is even stronger in rejecting judicial implementation of positive principles. “The 
Principles of social policy set forth in this article are intended for the general guidance of the 
Oireachtas.  The application of those principles in the making of the laws shall be the care of the 
Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be Cognizable by any Court under any provisions of the 
constitution.”  Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 45, available at  
http://www.constitution.ie/reports/ConstitutionofIreland.pdf (last visited March 6, 2007).  But cf. 
supra notes 69, 71-72 and accompanying text. 
 95. See generally Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1044-
56 (1989).  For the classic American argument against judicial review of legislation for 
constitutionality, see Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). See 
also CLINTON, supra note 6.  Mark Tushnet has proposed abolishing judicial review of legislation 
in the United States, leaving America with something closer to the British system.  Cf. TUSHNET, 
supra note 7. 
 96. “The typically republican tradition . . . was that Parliament itself was the guardian of 
constitutionality . . . with an ultimate control exercised by the electorate.”  BELL, supra note 18, 
at 21. 
 97. 1958 CONST.61 (Fr.).  But see BELL, supra note 18, at 48-56, for a discussion of the 
Constitutional Council’s attempts to extend its power. 
 98. UKRAINE CONST., supra note 5, at art. 152.  The Chilean Constitution of 2005 has a like 
provision, Art. 94. See supra note 5.  Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) for a similar 
but narrowly applied American rule.  Of course, the optional and occasional non-retroactivity 
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Thus state officials and the public know that they can rely on the validity of 
presently promulgated laws for all current activity; much of the legal 
uncertainty ordinarily generated by judicial review (the ever-present 
possibility of retroactive nullification of current law) has been eliminated.  
The Ukrainian Constitutional Court may still become a tyrant, but it will 
have to exert its will in a certain sense through the “rule of law,” i.e., by 
giving advance notice of the rules to which the nation must conform. 
It is, of course, quite possible to have ordinary legislation subject to 
judicial review for constitutional validity, with constitutional amendments 
left almost entirely free of review.  Even where a constitution explicitly 
declares certain types of amendments invalid, the courts need not take upon 
themselves the task of seeing that those limits are properly interpreted and 
applied—as has been the case in Norway.99 
All the above examples are subject to a possible misgiving.  Is it really 
wise to permit legal actors, who are interested primarily in results, to be the 
sole judge of the legality, including the constitutionality, of their own 
decisions?  Is this not a bit like letting someone be judge in his or her own 
case?  Should not some disinterested (or at least less interested) body 
review such actors’ interpretations of the law?  An affirmative answer to 
these questions has much merit. 
Yet even if some disinterested appellate process is a good idea, those 
appeals need not culminate in a single supreme national tribunal.  A 
legislature could have its own independent council of jurists scrutinize bills 
for constitutionality, as is arguably what has happened in the United 
Kingdom,100 rather than turning the task over to the courts.  Or a 
constitution could divide jurisdiction over constitutional questions among 
different tribunals.  This is the case in France today, where the 
Constitutional Council is permitted to review only legislative bills, while 
the Council of State reviews administrative actions and regulations for 
 
found in U.S. constitutional rulings cannot provide the legal certainty found in the mandatory 
Ukrainian and Chilean rules. 
 99. Article 12 of the Constitution of Norway provides that no amendment is valid if it alters 
“the spirit of the Constitution.” NORWAY CONST., art. 12.  But the prevailing interpretation of this 
clause has long been that it is only a directive to the legislature and does not authorize any court 
or other tribunal to refuse to recognize an amendment.  See D. Conrad, Limitation of Amendment 
Procedures and the Constituent Power, 15-16 INDIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L AFF. 347, 379-80 
(1970). 
 100. Since February 8, 2001, the Constitutional Committee in the House of Lords has been 
tasked to scrutinize bills for their “constitutional implications” for the British Constitution. The 
stated purpose of the Committee is, however, only to facilitate “informed debate.” House of 
Lords: The Constitutional Committee (April 2005), available at  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HofLBpConstitution.pdf. 
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constitutionality.101  Again, in Chile, the Pinochet regime resurrected a 
Constitutional Tribunal with the power to invalidate new legislation erga 
omnes, no doubt in order to halt any new drift toward socialism, while the 
old Supreme Court continued to have final say over whether already 
promulgated legislation was valid (but only as to the parties at hand, the 
Court’s decisions being without stare decisis or erga omnes effect).102  
Thus both in France and in Chile there could easily develop two differing 
visions of what the constitution means, each vision being applicable in a 
largely separate field. 
Even in nations with but a single interpreter of the constitution, a 
degree of interpretive pluralism may be preserved if that interpreter is not 
at the same time the final interpreter of all sub-constitutional law as well.  
Here examples abound.  The constitutional courts of Germany, Spain and 
Italy are officially the final and binding interpreters of the constitution, but 
one or more separate supreme courts may be the final interpreters of other 
parts of the law.103  Even in the United States, where the Supreme Court 
claims final interpretive power both over the federal constitution and over 
federal legislation, the interpretation of the law of the separate states is left 
almost entirely up to fifty different state supreme courts.  In such regimes, 
it would be difficult or impossible for the members of any single court to 
impose their way of understanding law on the whole legal system.  
Pluralism of interpretive approach is free to survive.104 
 
 101. Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann Glendon has thus called the Council of State “a 
second constitutional court of France.”  GLENDON ET AL., supra note 4, at 120.  But cf. BELL, 
supra note 18, at 48-56. 
 102. POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE  art. 82 & art. 80 (1980), 
respectively.  The Supreme Court’s final authority over the constitutionality of old law was 
recently transferred to the Constitutional Tribunal.  See supra note 5.  Only a simple majority of 
the Tribunal is required to declare any law unconstitutional as applied to the case at hand.  Id. at 
art. 93(6).  However, a four-fifths majority is required for the further holding that the law is 
unconstitutional erga omnes.  Id. at art. 93(7).  Thus a bit of interpretive pluralism is preserved, in 
that only the parties to the case would be held to the Tribunal’s view of the Constitution unless 
that view commanded a supermajority.  The Tribunal remains unbound by its own precedents.  Id. 
at art. 94. 
 103. In Italy, there is a separate Court of Cassation as in France, COSTITUZIONE [COST.], art. 
111, 134, while Spain has the Supreme Tribunal as well as the Constitutional Tribunal. 
CONSTITUCION [C.E.] §§123, 159, 160.  Germany has five separate non-constitutional final 
courts of appeal at the federal level, besides its Constitutional Court.  GRUNDGESETZ 
[GG][Constitution] art. 95(1), 96 (F.R.G.).  In France at least, the Constitutional Council appears 
(by means of “reservations of interpretation”) successfully to have claimed the power to give a 
final interpretation to the laws that it approves as constitutional, even though it has no direct way 
to enforce its interpretations once approval has been given.  BELL, supra note 18, at 53-56. 
 104. Unfortunately, such may not be the case in Ukraine, for a single body (the new 
Constitutional Court) has been given the power to issue binding interpretations both of the 
Constitution and of all other law throughout the nation.  UKRAINE CONST., supra note 5, art. 147, 
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“Free to survive” does not, of course, mean that many interpretations 
will in fact survive, but only that wherever unity of meaning does appear, it 
will come through persuasion rather than through coercion. Independent 
jurisdictions whose reasoning merits mutual respect are likely to be 
troubled by significant conflicts in interpretation and to seek to resolve 
their differences.  Witness the common law in the United States today, 
especially in those areas largely independent of statutes, such as contracts 
or torts: On the one hand, the court systems of each state are 
jurisdictionally separate from one another, so that differing interpretations 
of the same legal language or principle are fully permissible. On the other 
hand, if the interpretation arrived at in a particular state is rejected by many 
other states’ courts, it may well be reconsidered and overturned even in the 
first state.105 
One criticism that might be made of the separation-of-powers method 
of preventing judicial tyranny is that it cuts short the appellate process—by 
cutting off the top of the judicial pyramid—thus permitting interpretive 
mistakes made by lower courts or other institutions to stand more easily.  
This is not, however, a telling argument against separation of powers.  If it 
is thought, for example, that at least two appeals are appropriate before any 
interpretation of law becomes final in a given case, this can easily be 
instituted without entrusting the ultimate appellate instance on every kind 
of issue to the same tribunal.  What is crucial for separation of powers is 
that the appellate process be split up, not that it be shortened. 
Another critique106 is that unless some tribunal is given what the 
Germans call Kompetenz-Kompetenz (jurisdiction over questions of legal 
power), jurisdictional conflicts will defeat any separation-of-powers 
scheme.  This is probably true, but we need not convert any separated 
power into a super-tribunal.  Instead, for example, each branch could be 
given a limited power to check overreaching by the other branches107 or 
else a tribunal authorized only to resolve jurisdictional issues, along the 
 
150(2).  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada, which was created by the Federal Government 
by the Supreme Court Act through §101 of the Constitution Act of 1867, has become the final 
interpreter of all Canadian law, animated apparently by a desire to impose continent-wide 
uniformity.  See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 8.5(a) (3d ed. 1992). 
 105. Especially where the texts and other sources of law being interpreted differ between 
jurisdictions, however, this process of mutual adjustment is plausibly motivated not by 
faithfulness to law but by the desire to please one’s judicial peers in other jurisdictions.  See 
SLAUGHTER, supra note 57.  It is thus important (for purposes both of separation of powers and 
of checks and balances) that some interpretive authority be given to self-confident non-judicial 
persons and institutions—e.g., presidents, legislatures, ethnic regions, religious groups and any 
others whose democratic or cultural base makes them less likely to need the esteem of judges. 
 106. This critique appears in Alexander and Solum, supra note 7. 
 107. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (outlining such a suggestion). 
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lines of the French Tribunal des Conflicts or the original lines of the 
Constitutional Council, could be created.108 
A more profound criticism would be this: Whether final interpretation 
is united in a single court or divided among many institutions, the rest of us 
are left subject not to the law itself but to the interpretations of the law 
handed down by fallible human beings, interpretations that may over time 
distance themselves greatly from the original legal sources.  Do we really 
wish our officials, or our citizens, blindly to follow what they perceive to 
be clearly erroneous interpretations of fundamental law—even if those 
interpretations are less potentially despotic because they emanate from 
multiple interpreters?  Even if it is better for the President of France to be 
bound to the constitutional interpretations of two tribunals (the 
Constitutional Council and the Council of State) rather than only of one, 
what if he thinks both to be wrong?  Should he not have some additional 
duty to be faithful to the French constitution as he himself perceives it?  
Separation of Powers may escape from the “Rule of One Supreme Court,” 
but it does not secure the Rule of Law. 
B. Checks and Balances 
A deep desire to be faithful to the law generates “checks and 
balances,” the second method of limiting high court power.  The essential 
idea here is to entrust multiple interpreters not with separate powers over 
the meaning of the law, but with joint power.  For example, rather than 
attempt carefully to divide power to interpret a constitution among the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government (the separation-
of-powers approach), a nation could give each a right or duty to refuse to 
participate in unconstitutional acts by the other two, to be faithful to that 
basic document as a whole rather than only to its own part of it.  Thus a 
supreme court would refuse to apply unconstitutional legislation,109 while 
 
 108. For example, Professor Weiler has advocated the creation of an additional European 
tribunal (or council) with jurisdiction over competences (and subsidiarity): “I have gone so far as 
suggesting the creation of a new Constitutional Tribunal, composed of sitting judges of the 
highest Courts in each of the Member States (sitting only ad-hoc so they do not become 
socialized into a Community ethos) which would decide issues of division of competences 
between the EU and its Member States and . . . take that job away from the European Court of 
Justice!”  R. Stith & J.H.H. Weiler, Can Treaty Law Be Supreme, Directly Effective, and 
Autonomous—All at the Same Time? (An Epistolary Exchange), 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &  POL. 
729, 738 (2002).  See also Menaut, supra note 75, at 94; J.H.H. Weiler, The European Union: 
Enlargement, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, Forum Constitutionis Europae, November 29 
(1999), http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/english/fce/fce799/weiler.htm. 
 109. Such was Justice Marshall’s classic argument in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
at 137 (1803).  Marshall reasoned that a justice taking an oath to follow the Constitution is bound 
in conscience to refuse to comply with orders from another branch of government that the justice 
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the legislature and executive would likewise not carry out unconstitutional 
supreme court decisions.  Whenever some governmental action required 
cooperation among the three branches, a consensus about the constitution’s 
meaning would be needed.  The danger of unconstitutional state action 
would be decreased at the cost of an increase in the frequency of 
governmental paralysis.  Of course, this is what checks and balances are all 
about—balancing power against power, a balance coming here not from 
conflicting interests but from joint faithfulness to the same basic law.110 
This necessarily cooperative faithfulness to the law is what makes 
checks and balances preferable to separation of powers as a rule-of-law 
alternative to judicial supremacy.  Both alternatives avoid the political 
danger of consolidated judicial power, but mere separation may not make 
fidelity to law sufficiently likely.  With mutual review, each interpreter has 
a stronger motive to persuade others that its interpretation is the most 
plausible.  The ensuing conversation will thus tend to center on and circle 
about the law, restraining any centrifugal forces that might otherwise cause 
interpreters to fly away from that which they are interpreting. 
In other words, the checks-and-balances (mutual review) approach is a 
structural way to overcome the politicized skepticism about legal meaning 
that so threatens the rule of law today. Lawyers may merely offer 
predictions of judicial decisions when they speak to their clients, but not 
when they speak to judges. Even the most skeptical lawyer must argue 
about the true meaning of the law when standing in court.  Likewise, no 
matter how personally “Legal Realist” or result-driven a judge may be, if 
she must persuade others that she has found the correct meaning of a text, 
she will have to so argue.  Since argument presupposes truth,111 everyone 
 
thinks unconstitutional, at least where those orders impinge on the Court’s own constitutionally 
assigned jurisdiction.  Id.  The checks-and-balances approach emerges from the recognition that 
oath-takers in other branches of government would accordingly have a like duty to refuse to 
cooperate with Supreme Court justices who appear to be acting unconstitutionally.  Marshall’s 
oath-based argument for judicial non-compliance with the legislature thus becomes an argument 
for legislative (and executive) non-compliance with the judiciary. 
 110. If it were thought necessary to avoid all possibility of paralysis, this mutual review 
model could be used only to limit central or supranational authority, so that provincial or national 
governments remained unified and thus free to act with more dispatch.  See also supra note 87 
and accompanying text (outlining ways to avoid paralysis through accommodation). 
 111. Only if truth exists but is not known to be fully contained in any one opinion, will 
argument have purpose.  If there is no truth, or if just one opinion of it counts, we have no motive 
to reason with one another.  The most powerful preference simply wins without argument.  
Similarly, if one opinion or even several (jurisdictionally separate) opinions about the law are 
final regardless of their persuasive power, law fails to join us together in a deliberative 
community.  Only if we think ourselves necessarily engaged in a common effort to be faithful to 
juridical truth will we reason together around and about the law.  In a nation that seeks to be 
bound together through constitution and law, this unitive effect matters.  But still more important 
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who is forced to argue becomes committed to truth—at least in public.112  If 
we can institutionalize a need for the highest courts to convince rather than 
only to declare, we can make them at once less despotic and more faithful 
to the law. This is the fundamental intent and argument of this Article. 
There is, of course, no reason that separation of powers could not be 
combined with checks and balances.113  For example, constitutional 
requirements for quorum might be interpreted solely by the legislature, 
those for administrative agency appointments wholly by the executive, and 
those concerning trial procedures wholly by the courts, while all three were 
charged with the duty of refusing to cooperate in another branch’s 
limitations on freedom of speech. 
Two theoretically and historically important questions arise in regard 
to checks and balances: (1) What degree of non-cooperation is 
appropriately authorized in a given legal regime?  (2) What persons or 
institutions are appropriately authorized to refuse cooperation with what 
they perceive to be illegal acts by high courts? 
Absolute non-cooperation with unconstitutional or otherwise illegal 
high court decisions would mean that some cases could never be settled.  
This is just what happened for a time in immediate post-revolutionary 
France.  Ideological commitment to the will of the legislature and 
concomitant suspicion of high courts led to lower courts being authorized 
to refuse to apply a higher court’s seemingly erroneous interpretation, after 
appeal and remand, the lower court thus having permission to remain 
faithful to the law itself, rather than to the higher court’s interpretation 
 
may be the epistemological effect mentioned in the text: that an institutionalized need to engage 
in persuasive interpretation can generate an effort to find the law's true meaning. 
Mark Tushnet seems to foresee a different consequence of interpretive pluralism.  In his article, 
supra note 6, he writes: 
conflict [over interpretation] . . . would demonstrate that constitutional law is indeed 
political law, and that conflicts over the proper interpretation of the Constitution have 
to be worked out through a political system that, although taking into account the 
Constitution’s text, is not determined by the text or, worse, by authoritative 
interpretations of the text. 
That is, Tushnet seems to say that this Article’s checks-and-balances proposal would move 
interpretation away from texts and toward politics.  I do concede that interpretive centralism in a 
high court, especially if combined with a prohibition on publishing dissenting court opinions, 
may appear more tied to a text.  But this Article has endeavored to show that such a non-political 
appearance is likely to be both false and non-credible in this new century.  Given that politicized 
interpreters are likely to depart notoriously from the law, the question is how to draw them back.  
This Article proposes that the need to convince others of the meaning of the law will be a 
centripetal influence.  Neither all-powerful single interpreters nor purely political actors have this 
motive to slow their flight from the law. 
 112. See R. Stith, The Problem of Public Pretense, VIII(1) INDIAN PHIL. Q. 13 (1980). 
 113. See also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (showing that each must inevitably 
contain an element of the other in any event). 
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thereof.  Thus a trial court might decide a case under one legal 
interpretation; the Court of Cassation might disagree with that 
interpretation and send the case back for a new lower court decision; the 
lower court might be unpersuaded by the high court and reaffirm the first 
interpretation, leading to another appeal, and so on indefinitely.  France 
finally modified its appellate rules to require the lower court to go along 
with the high court at the second remand,114 and this surely makes sense.  
For any given set of parties, there ought to be an end to litigation at some 
point, not an endless stalemate founded in common loyalty to law rather 
than to courts. 
Such was essentially President Abraham Lincoln’s position in 
response to the United States Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision refusal 
to apply a Congressional statute the Court considered unconstitutional. 
That is, although he considered restoring the slave Dred Scott to his master 
“evil,” he accepted that result as res judicata, because not to do so would 
have led to still greater evils.  But at the same time he denied any strong 
vertical stare decisis effect of that decision.115  He accepted judicial review 
of statutes for unconstitutionality but refused to recognize the consequent 
expansion of slavery to be binding beyond the parties to the case at hand.  
In an ongoing debate with Stephen Douglas, Lincoln had defended his 
position with the following argument: 
 
 114. Regarding this sequence of events, see JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 
487 (1968). Saudi Arabia, a nation whose legal system has been strongly influenced by France, 
also permits a period of back-and-forth dialogue between trial and appellate court, before the 
latter finally imposes its interpretation.  Articles 187-188 THE LAW OF PROCEDURE BEFORE THE 
SHARI’AH COURTS, Royal Decree No. (M/21) 19 August 2000, Umm al-Qura No. 3811 15 
September 2000. 
 115. Lincoln’s classic exposition of his recognition of res judicata combined with his 
rejection of judicial supremacy is found in this paragraph in his First Inaugural Address: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be 
decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any 
case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to 
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the 
Government.  And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in 
any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, 
with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, 
can better be borne that could the evils of a different practice.  At the same time, the 
candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions 
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, 
the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the 
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned 
their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.  Nor is there in this view any 
assault upon the court or the judges.  It is a duty from which they may not shrink to 
decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to 
turn their decisions to political purposes. 
LINCOLN, supra note 24, at 220-21. 
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[I]n respect for judicial authority, my humble history would not 
suffer in a comparison with that of Judge Douglas.  He would have 
the citizen conform his vote to that [Dred Scott] decision; the 
member of Congress, his; the President, his use of the veto power.  
He would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the 
departments of the government.  I would not.  By resisting it as a 
political rule, I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite 
no mobs.116 
Lincoln was not original in his split between deference to final judicial 
interpretation in the individual case and refusal to acknowledge that 
interpretation to be permanently binding on non-parties (as the doctrine of 
stare decisis would demand).117  The core of European legal thought has 
long denied judicial precedent to be binding, though the opprobrium 
attached to “government of judges” may be of more recent origin.118  In 
 
 116. Speech at Springfield Illinois (July 17, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHS AND 
WRITINGS, 1859-1865 at 472-473 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., Literary Classics of the United 
States 1989).  Lincoln later crossed the line he had drawn and resisted the Court in the name of 
the Constitution even in a particular case, indeed, even when faced with a direct order from the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 278-82 (discussing the 
Merryman affair). 
 117. Theodore F.T. Plucknett concludes that in English law a single judicial decision (as 
opposed to a long-standing custom of the courts) did not become fully binding in later cases until 
the nineteenth century, after the American colonies had become independent.  A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 347-50 (1956).  Federalist 78’s claim that the judiciary is the 
“least dangerous” branch, having “no influence over either the sword or the purse,” would make 
little sense if the judiciary could impose its constitutional interpretations upon these other 
branches beyond the case at hand.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 393-94.  
One careful scholar has concluded: “One may summarize by saying that it can be established that 
American cases, up to the year 1800, had no firm doctrine of stare decisis.  By 1825 some of the 
older states had come to a firmer stand on the authority of prior cases, and by 1850 this stand was 
solidified.”  Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 
1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 50 (1959).  Writing and research in this area is often marred by a 
failure to distinguish the binding quality of numerous precedents, an essential element of all 
customary law, and the binding (even if not absolutely binding) quality of a single precedent, the 
hallmark of stare decisis. 
Writing in the 1830s, de Tocqueville appears to describe legal life in an America under a form of 
decentralized judicial review lacking stare decisis: 
[O]n the day when a judge refuses to apply a law [that he considers unconstitutional] in 
a case, at that instant it loses a part of its moral force. Those whom it has wronged are 
then notified that a means exists of escaping the obligation of obeying it: cases 
multiply, and it falls into impotence. . . . [T]he law thus censured is not destroyed: its 
moral force is diminished but its material effect is not suspended. It is only little by 
little and under the repeated blows of jurisprudence that it finally succumbs. 
In the end, assuming the courts are not persuaded to change their view, “one of two things then 
happens: the people change their constitution or the legislature rescinds the law.”  ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96-97 (H.C. Mansfield & D. Winthop trans., 2000). 
 118. Vogenauer, supra note 17, at 489 (citing the Emperor Justinian’s admonition “cum non 
exemplis, sed legibus iudicandum est”); Bart Neuborne, Judical Review and Separation of 
Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 382 n.67 (1982) (explaining that 
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thus denying courts the power to make law beyond the case at hand, 
important checks and balances are put into place.  Courts are not rendered 
impotent; after all, they may still have their interpretive way if they persist 
in their views on a case-by-case basis.  Unless the Supreme Court changes 
its mind, other slaves will eventually be re-attached by the Court to their 
masters—just as Dred Scott was re-attached—but without the help of 
Lincoln’s executive branch.  But the courts cannot easily or efficiently 
impose their views on the nation by fiat.  Instead, they must use persuasion. 
Faithful interpretation requires above all such restriction of the 
doctrine of stare decisis, for this doctrine holds in its essence that truth 
does not matter.  All courts, in every nation, follow prior judicial decisions 
that they think were correctly decided.  Binding precedent requires 
something more, namely, that they abide by prior decisions they think 
wrong.  Its entire purpose is to avoid further deliberation about original 
meanings.  It is a doctrine of unfaithfulness, a pledge not to be true to the 
law but only to its latest interpreter.119 
Horizontal stare decisis prevents the law from ever becoming settled 
in the sense of converging on an interpretation agreed to be accurate, as the 
doctrine of jurisprudence constante permits in Europe.  A series of 
constantly repeated interpretations becomes overwhelming evidence of 
their correctness only where each has looked back to the original law.  A 
similarly long line of cases following an absolutely binding precedent is no 
evidence at all of the correctness of that precedent.120 
 
the French Left first used the phrase “government of judges” in opposition to the Lochner-era 
U.S. Supreme Court’s use of judicial review).  Dawson cites German authorities from the 1920s 
indicating that since “all judges are bound by the  
law . . . each judge is free—indeed obligated—to fasten his sights on the legislative text and draw 
his own conclusions independently.”  Supra note 114, at 487. 
 119. “It is the view that because we have got into a mess we must grow messier to suit it; that 
because we have taken a wrong turn some time ago we must go forward and not backwards; that 
because we have lost our way we must lose our map also; and because we have missed our ideal, 
we must forget it.”  G.K. CHESTERTON, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 124-25 (1994). 
(Dodd, Mead and Company 1910) (speaking of precedent in contexts other than courts).  
Continuing Chesterton’s metaphor, we may note that any binding quality in precedent warns us 
against taking a short side trip (making an exception to a rule out of a felt sense of the equities of 
the case) or exploring a possible shortcut (tentatively following an apparently better rule) under 
pain of having to continue in that direction.  That is, to the degree to which precedent binds, it 
makes us choose between rigidly adhering to our ideals and flatly giving them up, neither of 
which seems a good way to live. 
For a listing of articles arguing that stare decisis regarding interpretations of the U.S. Constitution 
is actually unconstitutional, in that it raises prior institutional error above what the sitting justices 
think the Constitution really requires, see Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case 
Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 3 nn.11, 12 (2007). 
 120. Fortunately, in the United States horizontal stare decisis has rarely been treated as 
absolute.  Nevertheless, it remains true that insofar as a precedent is thought binding, 
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In its purely vertical form, stare decisis is analogous to “democratic 
centralism,” the political doctrine that disagreement and debate are 
permitted only until the central authority has reached a decision.121  
Vertical stare decisis binds all courts and other institutions subordinate to 
the court making the precedential decision.122  Although (unlike horizontal 
stare decisis) this vertical version does not stop the highest judicial 
authority from correcting its own past errors, the doctrine can still have 
irrational effects, and is especially dangerous in areas where subsequent 
legislative clarification is difficult or unlikely.  The binding character of 
prior high court legal interpretation on future cases in the lower courts 
means that, although the high court might change its mind if it realized its 
prior mistakes, it is unlikely to be adequately informed of any errors.  
Lower courts will enforce interpretations that descend from on high, 
regardless of whether they agree with them, so that attempting to retry an 
issue already decided by the high court becomes almost pointless.  Like a 
democratic-centralist leader who has closed himself off from news of 
dissatisfaction among the populace, the supreme court in a vertical stare 
decisis system ordinarily refuses to hear of any objections to its prior legal 
interpretations.123 
 
reexamination of its original correctness is excluded.  To this degree, then, a line of cases does 
not provide proof of original meaning. 
 121. The term “democratic centralism” refers here to an organizational principle espoused by 
Vladimir Illich Lenin, the leader of the Russian Revolution of 1917: 
Freedom of discussion, unity of action—this is what we must strive to achieve. . . . In 
the heat of battle, when the proletarian army is straining every nerve, no criticism 
whatever can be permitted in its ranks.  But before the call for action is issued, there 
should be the broadest and freest discussion and appraisal of the resolution, of its 
arguments and its various propositions. 
V.I. Lenin, Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P: A Letter to the St. Petersburg 
Workers (May 1906) in V.I LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS vol. 10 376-81 (Andrew Rothstein ed., 
4th English ed., Progess Publishers 1972) available at 
http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/RUC06.html#s8 (last accessed Mar. 16, 2007). 
 122. American practice is a combination of this vertical form with horizontal elements.  
While lower courts are bound absolutely by prior Supreme Court decisions, that Court itself may 
overrule its prior cases.  Simply realizing it made a mistake and acted unconstitutionally cannot 
be a sufficient reason to alter its mandate, however, for otherwise the doctrine of stare decisis 
would have no effect.  The essence of the doctrine of stare decisis is the requirement to adhere to 
erroneous precedents. 
 123. Judge Edith Jones recently pointed to the structural blindness of the United States 
Supreme Court: 
[T]he problem inherent in the Court’s decision to constitutionalize abortion policy is 
that . . . the Court will never be able to examine its factual assumptions on a record 
made in court . . . .  That the Court’s constitutional decision making leaves our nation in 
a position of willful blindness to evolving knowledge should trouble any dispassionate 
observer not only about the abortion decisions, but about a number of other areas in 
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Judicial review of statutes need not include either form of stare 
decisis, and so need not involve binding interpretation.124  If a supreme 
court is empowered only to refuse to apply an unconstitutional statute to 
the parties in a particular case, its interpretation obviously has quite 
minimal power to bind, as Lincoln saw clearly.  Except in matters of res 
judicata, no other officials are bound to prefer that court’s interpretation to 
their own interpretation of the constitution.125  Even where a tribunal has 
been constitutionally empowered to strike down a statute erga omnes—i.e., 
to impose its constitutional interpretation upon the whole nation—a 
particular interpretation by that court need not become stare-like, i.e., 
binding upon the future.  The legislature may be left free to enact like 
legislation, flying in the face of the court’s interpretation of the 
constitution, and lower courts may be left free to uphold that legislation.  
Judicial review may ultimately give a constitutional court its way with any 
statute.  But if its constitutional interpretations are not persuasive, it may 
well soon have a chance to change its mind as long as judicial review 
remains wholly without horizontal or vertical stare decisis effect.126 
 
which the Court unhesitatingly steps into the realm of social policy under the guise of 
constitutional adjudication. 
McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir. 2004). 
The European Court of Justice has adopted a more open-minded form of vertical stare decisis.  
While national courts are permitted to rely on a prior ECJ interpretation of the treaties, they may, 
upon request, have the ECJ revisit the question at issue and perhaps change its mind. “[Even] 
where previous decisions of the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question . . . it 
must not be forgotten that . . . national courts and tribunals remain entirely at liberty to bring a 
matter before the Court of Justice if they consider it appropriate to do so.”  Case 283/81, CILFIT 
SRL v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.  Note also that the ECJ has never declared itself 
limited by any doctrine of horizontally binding precedent. 
 124. A court’s ability to strike down a statute certainly increases the reach of its 
interpretations of the law.  Such decisions do empower politicized judges.  However, without the 
doctrine of stare decisis, judicial review still permits interpretive pluralism, debate about the 
meaning of the constitution, in that it does not make earlier interpretations binding on later 
interpreters. 
Put another way: Centralized judicial supremacy is supported by three pillars.  The first is the 
highest court’s freedom from the past (linguistic skepticism or legal realism); this pillar is the one 
often attacked (in vain, this Article has argued) by conservatives.  The second is the court’s power 
over the people (judicial review of statutes), the most common objection of populists and 
decentralists.  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
YALE L. J. 1346 (2006).  Last is the court’s power over the future (stare decisis).  Lawless 
invalidation of a statute is, by itself, only a grave sin against the legal order.  The doctrine that a 
fundamental and erroneous precedent is binding amounts to apostasy. 
 125. Both Federalist 78 and de Tocqueville accept judicial review but not in ways that appear 
to bind non-parties.  Cf. supra note 117.  This was the situation with regard to the Supreme Court 
of Chile until recently.  See supra note 102. 
 126. Chile appears to have preserved such a practice in its recent consolidation of 
constitutional review.  The Constitutional Tribunal may only strike down a “precepto legal.”  See 
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We have already begun to answer the second question posed above, 
namely the question of which persons or institutions are appropriately 
authorized to check and balance what they perceive to be constitutional 
errors by a high court.  The national executive, the national legislature, and 
the lower courts have been mentioned.  It has also been suggested that at 
least the highest court itself should be authorized to change its mind (i.e., 
not be bound by horizontal stare decisis).  This last check may seem quite 
minimal, but it could be significant in those regimes that (unlike the United 
States of America)127 provide for frequent membership turnover on the 
court in question.128  In Ukraine, for example, the constitution mandates a 
tenure of only nine years for each judge on the Constitutional Court.129  If 
no horizontal stare decisis doctrine limits the Ukrainian Court, then the 
Court’s interpretations might not be very binding after all, since they can in 
effect be “appealed” to a different panel of judges nine years later. 
In a given legal order, there could be few or many institutions or 
persons authorized to refuse to follow what appears to be an erroneous 
supreme or constitutional court decision.  Many would, however, be 
preferable to few, for the goal should be to have the various interpreters 
share as little as possible besides the common law they are interpreting. 
That way, they will be less likely to find agreement on any basis other than 
the requirements of the law.130 
It would be impossible to list all available mechanisms for checking 
and balancing a high court.  But a few interesting possibilities can be 
touched upon. 
For example, the logic of compact suggests that nations entering a 
federal union retain the ability to check any central government of limited 
 
supra note 102, art. 93(6) and 93(7).  It is given no power to impose a doctrine or a general 
principle of law. 
 127. In the U.S., Supreme Court Justices are appointed during “good behavior,” which means 
for life, unless impeached and removed by Congress, which has never happened.  U.S. CONST. 
art. III, §1. 
 128. See COSTITUZIONE [Constitution], tit. VI, art. 135(3) (Italy) (judges on the 
Constitutional Court in Italy are elected to nine–year terms), available at 
http://expired.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html; see also, South Korea—[Constitution], ch. 
VI, art. 112(1) (1948) (terms for judges on the Constitutional Court is six years), available at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ks00000_.html. 
 129. UKRAINE CONST., supra note 5, at art. 148 (reappointment to Constitutional Court is not 
possible), available at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm; see also COSTITUZIONE 
[Constitution] (Italy) (reappointment is not permitted for judges on the Constitutional Court), 
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html; compare Constitution of South 
Korea, art. 112(1) (reappointment permitted on Constitutional Court), available at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ks00000_.html. 
 130.  See supra note 105 for a discussion of the need for some interpreters other than 
professional judges. 
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powers that they have created.  If a federal government—backed by the 
highest federal court—exceeded the mandate agreed upon by those member 
states when they originally set it up, they would have a right to refuse to 
comply with that government’s ultra vires acts.  This was the argument of 
many American states before the Civil War, and it has been raised 
especially by Germany in providing a rationale for resistance to the 
European Court of Justice.131 
Canada has contributed an imaginative sort of check upon its Supreme 
Court.  The Canadian Constitution (1982) provides in Part I, Article 33, 
that when provincial or national law has been declared unconstitutional by 
the Court, the legislature from which the law came may bring it back into 
force “notwithstanding” its unconstitutionality, but only for a renewable 
period of five years.132  The intent here seems to be to give democratically 
elected legislators the final word, but on condition that they continue to 
listen to the Court, in the hope that one side or the other might eventually 
change its mind.  However, this Canadian device cannot count as an 
instance of institutionalized interpretive pluralism, of checks and balances 
regarding interpretation, for the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
remains final.  The legislature is simply given the power to act 
unconstitutionally for renewable five-year periods.  Unfortunately, the 
political burden of re-passing an officially declared “unconstitutional” law 
has been so great that no dialogue has ever begun.133  After all, those who 
resist the Court are also resisting the Constitution, albeit with permission to 
do so.  Things might have been different had the legislature explicitly been 
 
 131. See Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany 
Be the “Virginia of Europe”?, 43 AM. J. COMP L. 177 (1995).  A further question is which 
branch or branches of the member state governments are authorized to decide upon such 
resistance. 
 132. See Constitution Act 1982, Pt. I Art. 33: 
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of 
this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this 
section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of 
this Charter referred to in the declaration. 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it 
comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. 
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under 
subsection (1). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4). 
Available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html#I. 
 133. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 
719-27 (2001). 
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given a power of interpretive (rather than merely political) dissent—had the 
Canadian Constitution made clear that the Court can be wrong and that 
each legislature has an equal right, along with the Court, to interpret the 
Constitution, and a right to re-pass its nullified statute as long as the 
legislature remains unconvinced by the Court’s arguments for the law’s 
unconstitutionality.  With such encouragement, a legislature might be much 
more likely to resist extravagant judicial interpretations. 
Check and balance is also less likely to occur where it is associated, as 
it often is, with a constitutional crisis.  In Canada, at least there is clear 
legal permission for the legislature to resist the Supreme Court.  In the 
European Union, by contrast, the European Court of Justice is the sole 
interpreter of Community law, according to the Treaty on European 
Union,134 and the ECJ has recognized no legitimate opposition to its 
interpretations.  It takes an utterly self-confident court in a powerful nation, 
e.g., the German Constitutional Court, to stand up the ECJ and say “your 
power to interpret does not include a power to amend.”  Because the ECJ 
fails to recognize the lawfulness of German resistance, any actual 
resistance would lead to a constitutional crisis in Germany as to which 
court to obey.  Neither court would know in advance that it would be 
victorious.  Perhaps for this reason, no resistance has ever actually 
occurred; it has been only threatened (though the threat may well have had 
some effect).135 
Constitutional crises are not, however, a necessary part of the check-
and-balance proposals put forward in this Article.  If all agree that only the 
parties to a case are bound by a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality, 
as is still possible in Chile, no crisis occurs when the executive continues to 
enforce the impugned statute.  Where there is a consensus that precedent is 
not binding, as may occur in France, official refusals to conform to the 
rationale behind earlier high court decisions result in no breakdown of the 
rule of law.  Crises occur, rather, when significant public institutions 
become convinced of their duty of fidelity to the law while a great court 
instead continues to demand fidelity to itself.  Mutual review is not 
internally unstable, but there may well be temporary instability if it must 
first defeat entrenched judicial supremacy. 
What of the argument that ordinary citizens, as well as state officials, 
should feel (and be explicitly) authorized to resist unfounded high court 
interpretations of their nation’s laws and constitution?  If law itself is to 
rule, rather than some court’s interpretations thereof, then shouldn’t any 
 
 134. EC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 220 & 234. 
 135. See J.H.H. Weiler, European Neo—Constitutionalism: In Search of the Foundations of 
European Constitutional Order, 44 POL. STUD. (3) 517, 531-33 (1996). 
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law-abiding citizen be as free as a president to resist fundamentally 
erroneous interpretations by that court? 
Such a check might seem to go too far, might seem to slide back into 
the disorder we rejected at the beginning of this article, by advocating a 
“right of resistance.”  Yet even “citizen review” need not lead to instability, 
as long as we attend carefully to the distinction between res judicata and 
stare decisis.  If every citizen had a right to resist erroneous interpretations 
of the law in every individual case, chaos might well erupt—though in 
extreme circumstances disorder could be the lesser evil.136  But if each 
citizen is only freed to think for herself about what the constitution or the 
law means in future cases, freed to refuse to bow to stare decisis in any 
form, she has merely a right (in a test case perhaps) to ask state officials 
and courts—who are also wholly unbound by stare decisis—to revisit 
issues already reached by the highest court, which is not a radical doctrine 
at all.  These officials, after all, will enforce the Constitution as they 
understand it, not as the dissenter understands it.  If they agree with the 
highest court’s jurisprudence, the dissenter will not get far.  But if some 
came to agree with the dissenter’s constitutional interpretation, the issue 
would again be appealed.  A high court that remained convinced of its own 
righteousness might be able to force each separate dissenter to comply with 
its commands, but in order to elicit voluntary cooperation and enforcement 
it would have to persuade many courts and other listeners that it truly spoke 
for the constitution. 
Conclusion 
As the distinction between interpretation and politics diminishes, the 
need for pluralism in interpretation increases.  The more the judiciary 
arrogates political power to itself, the more necessary a pluralism of legal 
interpretation becomes.  No one tribunal should possess the power to bind a 
whole legal system to its politicized interpretations of the law. 
This article has analyzed two tested alternatives to concentrating 
interpretive authority in a single court.  Under the “separation of powers” 
approach, some or many jurisdictionally distinct institutions are granted 
powers to interpret and apply the constitution and the laws.  A multiplicity 
 
 136. As we saw in note 27, citizen resistance to the courts, even in certain individual cases, 
seems to be permitted by the Basic Law of Germany.  Section 20(4) of that Constitution reads 
“[A]ll Germans have the right to resist any person or persons seeking to abolish [the] 
constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible.”  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] 
art. 20(4) (F.R.G.).  If the courts side with an unconstitutional regime, no other remedy remains 
and citizen resistance is authorized.  So far at least, the clause has not led Germany into anarchy. 
Whether it has been effective in moderating the interpretive license of major legal actors is 
another question. 
35.3 STITH ARTICLE - MCCARTHY FINAL 2/22/2008  2:37 PM 
Spring 2008]     RULE OF LAW THROUGH INTERPRETIVE PLURALISM 447 
of interpreters helps to prevent domination by any one legal ideology and 
to encourage reasoned dialogue about the meaning of law. 
“Checks and balances” likewise can hobble doctrinal despotism by 
requiring various degrees of coordination among interpreters of the law.  
Under the version that this Article has favored, each interpretation of law 
(or at least of constitutional law) binds only as to the claims in the case at 
hand, with no stare decisis control over future decisions.  The efforts of any 
interpreter to dominate and control political developments may thus be 
checked and balanced by loyalty to the law and constitution themselves, 
wherever that interpreter seems to stray too far from the source of its 
authority.  In this way, even in a skeptical age, courts and other public 
authorities are given an incentive to construct arguments convincingly 
moored to governing law.  Despite its difficulties and dangers, we need not 
abandon the rule of law. 
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